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INTRODUCTION

Arguably the big federalism case in a time of big federalism cases
is not Bush v. Gore,1 or Lopez, 2 or New York, 3 or even Boerne.4 My nomi1 121 S. Ct. 525, 529, 532-33 (2000) (ruling, in a contested presidential election,
that a state supreme court violated the Equal Protection Clause by ordering a statewide recount of machine-rejected ballots under the state's statutory standard of"clear
intent of the voter;" interpreting the state's law to require a deadline such that there
was no time for the recount under more detailed standards; thus determining the
outcome of the presidential election).
2 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding that Congress
lacks commerce power to criminalize possession of guns near schools, such possession
not being an economic activity with a substantial effect on interstate commerce); see
also United States v. Morrison, 120 S.Ct. 1740, 1748-54 (2000) (holding, in part
under Lopez, that Congress had insufficient commerce power to enact the Violence
Against Women Act).
3 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161, 177 (1992) (holding, under the
Tenth Amendment, that Congress may not "commandeer" a state's legislative
processes to enact a federal program; striking down the "take tide" provision of the
Low Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act, while acknowledging that Congress has Article I power over radioactive waste disposal); see also Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (holding that Congress may not "commandeer" a
state's administrative processes to carry out a federal program, striking down the interim "background checks" provision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention
Act). The Court's new "anti-commandeering" principle revives, probably usefully, a
rule from the otherwise indefensible Priggv. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 622
(1842) (Story, J.) (holding, among other things, that Congress may not require state
magistrates to implement the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793):
As to the authority so conferred upon state magistrates, while a difference of
opinion has existed, and may exist still on the point, in different states,
whether state magistrates are bound to act under it, none is entertained by
this Court, that state magistrates may, if they choose, exercise that authority,
unless prohibited by state legislation.
See also Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 109-10 (1861) (holding that
Congress may not require a state governor to extradite a fugitive from justice).
4 City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (holding, under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and on principles of federalism, that Congress may not
enact remedies for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment unless the remedies are
proportional and congruent to a substantial pattern of violation; striking down at least
as to state actors the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); see also Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. 955, 963, 967-68 (2001) (holding, under Boerne, that Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power is insufficient to overcome state sovereign immunity in an
action under the Americans with Disabilities Act; holding also that discriminations
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nation would go to the case that is also the big case on the dual-court
system, Alden v. Maine5 That is the case in which the Supreme Court,
dividing five to four along its usual political fault line, held that Congress has no commerce power 6 to enforce federal law against an unconsenting state. Only three years earlier, in the stunning case of
Seminole Tribe of Floridav. F1orida,7 the Court had definitively stripped
Congress of commerce power to make federal law enforceable against
the states in the federal courts.8 But Seminole left intact the option of
private suit against a state in the state's own courts.9 Alden extends
Seminole to those courts. The rule of Alden is evidently intended to
against the disabled are subject only to minimal rational-basis scrutiny); United States
v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740, 1755, 1759 (2000) (striking down, in part under Boerne,
the Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67,
91-92 (2000) (holding, under Boerne, that Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power
is insufficient to overcome state sovereign immunity in an action under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coil. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 647-48 (1999) (holding, in part under Boerne, that
Congress cannot make the patent laws enforceable as against an infringing state on a
theory that the state deprives the patentee of property without due process of law).
5 527 U.S. 706, 712, 758-60 (1999) (holding that Congress lacks commerce

power to impose liability on a state in the state's oun courts for a %iolationof federal
law, striking down, as against a state employer, the priate cause of action provision of
the Fair Labor Standards Act).
6 The Alden Court uses broad Article I language, but also suggests that Congress
has Spending Clause power to extract waivers of immunity from the states as conditions on government spending. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (citing South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)). It is unclear whether Congress retains other Article I
powers to condition access to federal programs, or to federal rights, on -wiver.
7 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
8 See id. at 47, 76 (striking down the provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act that authorized a tribe to sue a state to compel it to comply with a statutory duty of
negotiation); see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. at 66-67, 91-92 (holding
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act unenforceable as against a state); Fla.
Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 647-48
(holding the patent laws unenforceable as against a state); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999) (holding the trademark laws unenforceable as against a state).
9 Although little used, prior to Alden the option of suing a state in its own courts
on a federal cause of action was probably fully available. Under the principle of Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 383 (1990), state courts were not free, and remain not free, to
apply state-law principles of sovereign immunity to bar actions under federal law. To
do so would be inconsistent with the Supremacy Clause. In Haelell, the particular
state immunity rule had become discriminatory, applying only to the claimant ith a
federal cause of action. Id. at 366-79. But the case would probably come out the
same way whether or not the immunity were discriminatory. On the general utility of
discrimination analysis in supremacy cases, see Louise Weinberg, The Federal-SaaleConflict of Laws: "Actual"Conflicts, 70 TEx. L. REv. 1743, 1778-83 (1992).
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come into play in the state's courts whenever-indeed, even thoughthe state defendant is also immune in federal court. Thus, Congress is
now substantially without commerce power over state violators of federal law in either set of courts.' 0
In this Article, I take up features ofJustice Kennedy's opinion for
the Alden Court that seem worthy of the term the law reviews reserve
these days for that which is without foundation: "myth." In this I do
not mean to heap particular opprobrium upon Justice Kennedy. The
Alden myths are to be found in earlier opinions and authorities. Expressions and analyses employed by Justice Kennedy date back at least
to 1890, to Justice Bradley's unfortunate opinion in Hans v. Louisiana." It is to Hans that we owe the spurious Eleventh Amendment
rule that the states are immune from private suit in federal courts
even in cases arising under federal law. 12 But although Hanswas unfounded, it was not as wrong in 1890 as it is now, for reasons that will
appear.' 3 So it is astonishing that Hans v. Louisiana is still law. In
Seminole Tribe, the Rehnquist Court majority characteristically spurned
a golden chance to rid us of Hans and made it even more of an obstacle to justice than it had been before. Alden manages to top even that
dubious achievement.
I begin by situating Alden (a case that came up through state
court 1 4 ) within the body of analogous jurisprudence governing cases
10 On the current power of Congress to limit or eliminate the jurisdiction of all
courts in cases of which it disapproves, see Louise Weinberg, The Article III Box: The
Power of "Congress" to Attack the Jurisdiction"of "FederalCourts," 78 TEx. L. RPv, 1405
(2000). For analysis of the power of Congress to vest jurisdiction in state as well as
federal courts (which turns out to be another way of describing the power of Congress
to vest questionable jurisdiction in federal courts), see Louise Weinberg, The Power of
Congress over Courts in Nonfederal Cases, 1995 BYU L. REV. 731 (1995).

11 134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890) (holding that the states have Eleventh Amendment
immunity from suits even in nondiversity cases arising under federal law). This provenance is also noted, with respect to Alden's law-office history, in John E. Nowak, The
Gang of Five & the Second Coming of an Anti-Reconstruction Supreme Court, 75 Nolmi

L. REV. 1091, 1094, 1100 (2000).
12 The Eleventh Amendment is explicitly addressed only to diversity cases. "The
Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST. amend.
XI.
13 See infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text.
14 Alden was originally brought in federal court; after the intervening decision in
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,517 U.S. 44 (1996), the First Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed dismissal on Eleventh Amendment grounds, see Mills v. Maine, 118
F.3d 37 (1st Cir. 1997). The Alden plaintiffs then brought their claim against Maine
in state court. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. at 712.
DAME
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in federal courts. I emphasize here certain recent radical changes in
preexisting jurisprudence. I view all this against the background of
recent controversy concerning the Eleventh Amendment's meaning.
I add my own perspectives and arguments on Alden to an already sub15
stantial literature.
I focus on the particular features of Alden that earn the designation of "myth." Alden rests on two longstanding theoretical myths: a
theory of state sovereignty and a theory of preExisting states. In the
main body of the Article, I analyze and provide counterarguments to
these positions. I point out that the Civil War itself must be understood as transforming national power vis-A-vis the states. I also note,
15 For critiques of Alden, see, for example, Daan Braveman, Enforcement ofFederal
Rights Against States: Alden and Federalism Non-sense, 49 AM. U. L Rrv. 611 (2000);
Enin Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisy ofAlden v. Maine:JudidalReview, Soverdgn Immunity
and the Rehnquist Court, 33 Loy. L.A. L REV. 1283 (2000); William A. Fletcher, The
Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75 NoTmE D,.%tE L RE%. 843 (2000); Vicki C.
Jackson, Principleand Compromise in ConstitutionalAdjudication: The Eleventh Amendment
and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAMiE L Rxv. 953 (2000); Vicki C. Jackson,
Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the DenationalizationofFederalLau,
31 RUTGERS UJ. 691 (2000); DanielJ. Meltzer, State Sovereign Immunity: FeAuthors in
Search of a Tteo , 75 No=E DA1i L. Rrv. 1011 (2000); Ana Maria Merico-Stephens,
Of Maine's Sovereignty, Alden 's Federalism, and the Mlyth of Absolute Prindples:The Newest
Oldest Question of Constitutional Law, 33 U.C. DAis L RE%. 325 (2000); Robert F.
Nagel; Judges and Federahism.:A Comment on 7ustice Kennedy's Vision of Federalism," 31
RUrGERS LJ. 825 (2000); Nowak, The GangofFve, supranote 11;John V. Orth, History
and the Eleventh Amendment, 75 NOTRE DA1 m L RE%,. 1147 (2000); James E. Pfander,
Once More Unto the Breach. Eleventh Amendment Sdwokmhip and the Court,75 NomE D AE
L. REV. 817 (2000); David L. Shapiro, The 1999 Trilogy: Wl7iat Is Good Federalism?, 31
RUTGERS L.J. 753 (2000); Suzanna Sherry, States Are People Too, 75 NOTRE D-1E L RE.
1121 (2000).
For more conciliatory approaches, see, for exarmple, Ann Athouse, The Alden
Trilogy: Still Searchingfora Way to EnforceFederalisi, 31 RUTGERS J. 631 (2000); Daniel
A. Farber, Pledging a New Allegiance: An Essay on Sovereignty and the New Federalism, 75
NOTE DwE L. REV. 1133 (2000); Roger C. Hartley, The Alden Trilog: Praise and
Protest, 23 H v. J.L. & PU. POL'Y 323 (2000); William P. Marshall, Understanding
Alden, 31 RUTGERS LJ. 803 (2000); William P. Marshall &Jason S. Coiaur, SlateIrmmitnity, PoliticalAccountability, andAlden v. Maine, 75 NOTRE D..E 1. REv. 1069 (2000);
Jay Tidmarsh, A DialogicDefense ofAlden, 75 NoTmE DA.%E L RE%,. 1161 (2000); Carlos
Manuel Vdzquez, Sovereign Immuniy, Due Process, and the Alden Trilog, 109 Y~u. UJ.
1927 (2000); Michael Wells, Suing States for Money: ConstitutionalRemedies After Alden
and Florida Prepaid, 31 RtrrGES LJ. 771 (2000); Ann Woolhandler, Old Property,New
Property, and Sovereign Immunh, 75 NoTRE DA~iE L REV. 919 (2000); Ernest A. Young,
Alden v. Maine and the Jurisprudenceof Structur4 41 Wbi. & M,%RY L REv. 1601 (2000).
Some of my earlier reflections on Alden appear in Weinberg, The Article III Box,
supranote 10, at 1427-31. At this writing, a splendid seminar has been announced, to
be held at Stanford, on Aldens sovereignty theory, a main subject of the present
Article.
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with others, that Alden's rhetoric of doctrinal inevitability is a myth,
since Alden is in tension with substantial bodies of constitutional jurisprudence. I take up the notion that Alden has little significance. I

point out that the major alternative remedy relied on in Alden is a
myth on the facts of Alden, a problem which, with one exception, I do
not find addressed in other commentary. Moreover, the other remedial options Alden purports to leave open can be inadequate or illusory. I also argue that Alden cannot be confined to commercial
statutory cases in the evident ambit of Article I, but threatens the en-

forcement of constitutional rights, notwithstanding Congress's Fourteenth Amendment power to remedy civil rights violations. I argue,
with others, that it is a myth that state immunity from federal law enforcement can be reconciled with the Constitution, that individual
rights can be balanced against a supposed governmental privilegenot to confine or regulate-but to violate them. The conclusion is
that the Alden/Seminole/Hansdispensation is and has been both intellectually unfounded and unjust.
I.

SrrUATING ALDEN

In Alden, the Supreme Court held that an unconsenting state
could not be sued in its own courts for a violation of federal law.' 6
Alden might be supposed to hold that when state courts administer
federal claims they must defer to their own laws on sovereign immunity whenever federal courts would do so. That would be a mistaken
reading of Alden. Alden does not have to do with a state's existing
sovereign immunity. Rather, Alden fashions a new, distinct, federal defense. 17 The new defense, like the Eleventh Amendment, is a "constitutional privilege."' 8
16 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712, 758-60 (1999).
17 The Supreme Court, of course, has no general power over the state law of
sovereign immunity. It has exercised federal common law-making power to fashion
federal defenses, however, even to state claims. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technologies
Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-13 (1988) (fashioning a new federal common-law defense
for military contractors in cases under state products liability law). This power is a
fortior in cases raising federal claims; the Court has power to say who shall be liable or
not for an infraction of federal law or a constitutional violation. See Howlett v. Rose,
496 U.S. 356, 383 (1990) (holding that a state may not selectively shield its school
boards from liability for a violation of the Constitution); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S.
800, 808-19 (1982) (surveying Supreme Court cases on official immunities for violations of federal civil rights). The Alden Court ruled, significantly, not as a matter of
the federal common law of state immunity to federal claims, but rather as a matter of
constitutional law. A chief difference between these sources of law, of course, is that
the latter strips Congress of the power of ordinary legislative override.
18 Alden, 527 U.S. at 754.
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On first reading, Alden can be understood simply as an extension,
albeit an extraordinary one, of the Eleventh Amendment-that first
successor to the Bill of Rights that is customarily read to render a state
immune to suit in federal courts. Justice Kennedy, the author of Alden, links the scope of the new defense in state courts to the scope of
the Eleventh Amendment defense in federal courts.19 In other words,
in cases after Alden, the scope of the immunity it declares will be adjudicated not under the state's view of its own sovereign immunity, but
under analogous federal cases on the Eleventh Amendment.2 0 But it
would be saying too much to say that Alden is an Eleventh Amendment case. Rather, the Alden Court insists that the new immunity it
announces emerges from background understandings of state immunity which allegedly preceded the Constitution, rather than from anything in the constitutional text. 2 1 The rule of Alden is to be found in
our unvritten-our implied-Constitution.2 2 Yet it would be saying
19 See id., at 712-13 (KennedyJ.) (noting common features of state immunity law
and Eleventh Amendment immunity, including the state's power of waiver and the
applicability of the immunity defense to private lawsuits only); see also id. at 713 ("We
have, as a result, sometimes referred to the States' immunity from suit as 'Eleventh
Amendment immunity.' The phrase is convenient shorthand ....

").

20 It is well established that the sovereign trying a case may, in its own courts,
define not only its own sovereign immunity, but the immunity of a sister sovereign.
For example, it is the federal Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994), that determines the scope of immunity of, say,
France, in all American courts, id. § 1604, rather than French law. Similarly, the
scope of immunity of Nevada, say, in an action in California, is not necessarily determined by Nevada's law, but may be determined by California's. See Neada v. Hall,
440 U.S. 410, 425-27 (1978) (holding California free to apply its own law to determine the sovereign immunity of Nevada in a wrongful death suit in California). Federal law on state immunity is unique in one way. The nation projects its view of a
state's sovereign immunity beyond the nation's own courts into the courts of that
state. This feature of Alden is also seen in its aspect of lifting the alleged immunity in
the earlier case of Howlet v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 383 (1990) (holding that federal law,
preampts a state's discriminatory immunity against federal claims).
21 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (Kennedy, J.):
[Tihe sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor is limited
by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather, as the Constitution's
structure, its history, and the authoritative interpretations by this Court
make clear, the States' immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they retain today (either literally or by virtue of their admission into the Union upon an equal footing with the other States) except as
altered by the plan of the Convention or certain constitutional
Amendments.
22 Alden immunityjoins such other features of the unwriuen Constitution as the
foreign relations power and the power of Congress in admiralty.
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too little to say that Alden is simply about the background understandings of state immunity that preceded the Constitution. Rather, Alden,
of course, is more directly about the power of Congress. Alden holds
that Congress has no commerce power to change this new-found old
immunity, precisely because the immunity is constitutionally required.
Alden extends to state courts the rule of Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, the Court's shocking 1996 case stripping Congress of commerce
23
power to expose a state to liability in federal courts.
These new blanket rules are intended to shield the unconsenting
state from liability. When put together with Lopez and Boerne, the
Rehnquist Court's new general limits on the power of Congress, that
purpose and more is substantially accomplished. These developments
advance the Rehnquist Court's apparent concern about excessive private litigation against the states, 24 as well as the Court's "new federalism" policies diminishing the power of the nation vis-A-vis the states.
Almost as importantly, Alden deftly erases the Eleventh Amendment,
with its inconvenient text, and slides the common law into its place.25
But Alden's narrow holding-denying Congress's commerce power on
federalism grounds-in itself, as an abstract proposition-should give
us pause, even setting to one side its apparent effect upon the rule of
law.
When the Court strikes down an act of Congress in the usual case,
Congress can go back to the drawing boards and rewrite the law constitutionally. In such a case, Congress "got it wrong" the first time by
invading some individual right; but Congress can still accomplish

whatever legitimate end it was trying to accomplish, as long as it avoids
the constitutional difficulty. Alden is not that sort of case. When the
Supreme Court strips Congress of legislative power in circumstances

23 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S 44, 47, 59-66 (1996) (holding that Congress has insufficient commerce power to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment immunity in federal courts) (overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
24 See Weinberg, The Article II Box, supra note 10, at 1420-22 (on "Tort Reform

and Constitution Reform;" discussing the Court's distaste for litigation).
25 Alden's technique of substituting the common law for inconvenient statutory
text has been seen also, e.g., in the case of Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-54
(1971), in which a common-law doctrine of "Our Federalism" was substituted, in certain civil rights cases, for the inconvenient text of the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283. The statute threatened to become ineffective to prevent a hemorrhaging of
state prosecutions and other cases into federal equity. Cf Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S.
225 (1972) (holding the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, an expressly codified exception to the Anti-Injunction Act). See LOUISE WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS:
CASES AND COMMENTS ON JuDicILAL FEDERALISM AND JUDICIAL

PowER 695-745 (1994).
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in which, as in Alden, Congress is infringing no individual right,2 6 the
Court enters the dangerous territory of Dred Scott v. Sandford27 or the
pre-1937 New Deal cases. 28 History does not forgive those cases, precisely because they stripped the legislative branch of power to try to
solve pressing national problems. And when the Court strips Congress of power trans-substantively, as it did in Alden, the Court must
move very cautiously indeed.
A.

Te Struggle over Union Gas

The generalist reader here may be troubled by an antecedent
question: Setting Alden to one side, why isn't Seminole Tribe right? All
Seminole Tribe holds is that Congress's commerce power does not enable Congress to undo Eleventh Amendment immunity. But surely Congress has no
power at all over the states'EleventhAmendment immunity, since the Eleventh
Amendment is a feature of the Constitution. Wy should Seminole Tribe

have been surprising? And if
Seminole Tribe was not surprising,and the
immunity is based on background understandings,why should Alden be surprising, extending the states' constitutionalprivilege over both sets of courts?
To clarify the answer to this it will be useful at this point to consider a
struggle in the Court that furnished the immediate context of Alden:
the battle over Union Gas.
At the time of Alden, there had been in place for some time a
statutory private right to sue for violation of the Fair Labor Standards
Act. Congress eventually extended this right to government workers.2 9 It is a perhaps regrettable fact that in order to provide minimal
protections for all American employees, including people who work
for the government, as Congress came to understand, concomitant
obligations must be imposed even on state governments. It is difficult
to regulate a great national market if a substantial part of that market
is exempt. In fact, of course, the state government may well be the
largest single employer in a given state. So Congress exposed the
26 For an extended argument on this point, SCCJESSE H. CIbOrrJUDIcLL. RFvNiE
A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF TtE Rou
OF THE SUPREME COURT 171-259 (1980).
27 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 450-51 (1856) (Taney, Cj.) (holding that Congress
had no power to settle the sectional controversy over slavery in the territories (rendering the Civil War almost inevitable)).
AND THE NATIONAL Pou-rIQ.. PROcESS:

28 See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 322-24 (1936) (holding that
Congress had insufficient commerce power to set nationally negotiated labor standards (rendering some of the acute problems of the Great Depression virtually unresolvable by the legislative branch)).
29 See Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L No. 75-718, 52 Stat. 1060 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)).
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states, as employers, to the same potential liabilities to which it exposed other employers. Jurisdiction of these cases was vested in any
court of competent jurisdiction, state or federal. 30 Did Congress have
the power to do all this?
We know that, at least until the Court revisits the question, Congress has substantive lawmaking power over fair labor standards even
when the employer is a state. That is the embattled ground the nation
claimed in Maryland v. Wirtz,3 1 that the states regained for a while in
NationalLeague of Cities v. Usery,3 2 and narrowly lost again in the Garcia
case.3 3 Under Garcia, Congress can require a state as employer to
conform to federal labor standards. But can Congress enforce those
standards against the state? The administration might be reluctant or
lack resources to prosecute or to seek injunctions against state officials
for every infraction. 34 The question, then, is whether Congress can
privatize the job, enlisting the plaintiffs' bar in the national enforcement effort. In other words, can Congress subject the state as an em-

ployer to pfivate suit? That question obviously becomes increasingly
important to the extent other enforcement mechanisms are insufficient or compromised in some way.
30 See 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994) (codifying the private cause of action and jurisdictional provisions of the Act).
31 392 U.S. 183, 199-201 (1968) (holding that Congress could extend the Fair
Labor Standards Act to state schools and hospitals; noting that professional employees were at that time excluded from the coverage of the statute); see also United States
v. California, 297 U.S. 175, 185-89 (1936) (sustaining the constitutionality of the
Safety Appliance Act as applied to a state-owned railway). Interestingly, in Wirlz,Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented. Douglas complained that the regulations at issue threatened to "overwhelm state fiscal policy." Wirtz, 392 U.S. at 203
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
32 426 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1976) (holding that Congress cannot subject state employers to the provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, because to do so would
"substantially restructure" public services), overruled by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro.
Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1985); see also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452,
473 (1991) (refusing to construe the Age Discrimination in Employment Act to protect a state's judiciary from mandatory retirement absent clear language in the
statute).
33 Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-57 (1985)
(holding, by a 5:4 vote, that Congress may set labor standards for state government
workers, in part on the thinking that the states were involved in the political process
leading to the legislation).
34 See United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965) (holding that the
states are not immune in actions brought by the United States; holding also that no
explicit statutory authorization is necessary); cf United States v. California, 332 U.S.
19, 26-28 (1947). On the problem of insufficient resources for enforcement, see infra
note 166 and accompanying text.
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As far as federal lawsuits are concerned, at the time of Alden we
already had the answer. In federal courts there could be no private
enforcement of federal right as against an unconsenting state. Under
the Eleventh Amendment, as interpreted in the much-criticized 1890
case of Hans v. Louisiana35 the state is immune from federal suit even

when a case arises under federal law, 36 even when a case involves civil
rights, 3 7 and even-the language of the Amendment notwithstand-

ing 8-when the plaintiff is a citizen of the same state. To be sure, the
venerable black-letter rule of Hans has been growing in disrepute;3 9
and ways have been found long ago to limit its force.40 But to the
extent Hans remains effective, it clearly fiustrates federal judicial enforcement against the states of federal constitutional and legal norms.
What could Congress do about this? The problem is that, given the
hierarchical superiority of the Constitution asserted from the start,
certainly in Marbuy v. Madison,4 1 Congress simply has no power of
legislative revision over anything in the Constitution. None. Zero.
(Well, there are one or two peculiar exceptions. 42 ) So at first it was
35 134 U.S. 1, 20 (1890) (holding, under the Eleventh Amendment, in an action
against a state by a citizen of that state, that a state may not be sued for a violation of
federal law in a case brought in the federal-question jurisdiction of a federal court).
36 That the federal nature of a claim would not take it out of the bar of the
Eleventh Amendment had already been established in diversity cases raising claims
under federal law. See, e.g., In reAyers, 123 U.S. 443,507-08 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 67-71 (1886); Louisiana v.Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727-28 (1882).
37 Ffzpadrick v. Bitzer; 427 U.S. 445 (1976), is not to the contrary. That case holds
only that the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress power to abrogate the Eleventh
Amendment to remedy a state violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, not that the
Eleventh Amendment does not count at all in a Fourteenth Amendment case as to
which Congress has not spoken. See id. at 456-57; see, e.g., Pennhtirst State Sch. &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 103-23 (1984) (applying the Eleventh Amendment
to bar pendent equitable state-law claims against a state hospital in a suit originally
raising Fourteenth Amendment rights).
38 Recall that the Eleventh Amendment is explicitly addressed only to diversity
cases, cases against a state by a nonresident. See supra note 12.
39 See infra notes 86-139 and accompanying text (on the "diversity dieory"
critique).
40 See infra notes 75-81 and accompanying text (on EparteYoung); see also ifra
notes 43-45 and accompanying text (on the now-disapproved doctrine of constructive
waiver).
41 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77 (1803) (asserting the superiority of constitutional over statutory text).
42 See, e.g., Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209, 210-11 (1972)
(holding that Congress has power to go as far as Article III permits in conferring
standing, and thus ruling that white tenants aggrieved by the absence of minority
tenants in their public housing could, as private attorneys general, raise the rights of
the minority tenants in a statutory action, although the Supreme Court might not
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thought that Congress could not constitutionally authorize federal
suit against a state, except in cases in which it would be possible to
condition federal funding, or to condition a state's participation in a
federal program,4 3 upon the state's waiver. Statutory rights or defenses conferred on the state could be seen as conditioned on waiver
of immunity from statutory liability. Yet if Congress could require
waiver for participation, participation increasingly came to be seen as
tantamountto waiver. In the end, that the state was subjected to liabil-

ity under an act of Congress was loosely deemed to be a constructive
waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 4 4 Why was not that in actuality a statutory abrogation-aswe say-of Eleventh Amendment immunity? In other words, notwithstanding Hans, it was becoming
increasingly clear that Congress could cut holes in the cloak of state
immunity-could "abrogate" it, however counter-intuitive the existence of such power might seem. By the time Seminole Tribe was

decided, in 1996, not one, but two important cases had established
that Congress did indeed have power to trump the Eleventh
Amendment.

45

othenvise find standing in such a case (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727
(1972))). Trafficante was saved in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578
(1992) (holding that Congress may not exceed Article III requirements in conferring
standing to sue). Compare Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd.of Elections, 360 U.S.
45, 53-54 (1959) (facially sustaining a state English literacy requirement for voting),
with Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 658 (1966) (sustaining, under Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, an act of Congress banning certain state literacy tests for
voting). The strongest example remains the "dry state" cases. Compare Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 125 (1890) (striking down a state prohibition law under the dormant Commerce Clause), with In reRahrer, 140 U.S. 545, 564-65 (1891) (sustaining a
state prohibition law under an act of Congress authorizing such state regulation).
43 Until very recently it was also believed that the state could constructively be
deemed to have waived its immunity if it participated in a program tinder federal law,

with or even without federal funding. It was also believed that when Congress places
clear liabilities on a state, the state should be deemed to have waived immunity, &e
Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 196-98 (1964), overrued by Coll. Say. Bank v.
Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 675-87 (1999); cf.Mathias v. WorldCom Technologies, Inc., 121 S.Ct. 1224 (2001) (granting certiorari in
part to consider whether a state commission's agreement to participate in implementing a federal regulatory program under the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996
constitutes a waiver of Eleventh Amendment immunity when the federal regulations
provide that determinations by the state commission will be reviewable in federal
court).
44 Pardencame to be cited as a case of constructive waiver. The state was seen as
wilfully putting itself "under" the statute. In reality, as will be seen shortly, Pardenwas
an earlier, stronger version of Union Gas.
45 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5, 23 (1989) (holding that Congress
has commerce power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment by imposing liability on a
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To take the last first, toward the end of his life, Justice Brennm
made a startling retreat 46 from a lifelong opposition 17 to Hans v. Loidsiana. But the retreat was only strategic.48 In Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co., like a trapeze artist reaching for a second swing, Brennan
leaped toward the counterintuitive position that Congress could
trump the Eleventh Amendment by ordinary legislation. Congress
could achieve this under its broad commerce powers. Brennan threw
a bone to his conservative brethren by sternly insisting that Congress
would have to provide a clear statement, in the language of the statute, that it intended to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment. 49 This in
fact made the case weaker than his earlier Pardencase, the major Warren Court case on these issues, which required a clear statement by
Congress only of an intention not to include states as defendants: 0
state and incorporating a clear statement of abrogation in the language of the statute); Fitpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976) (holding that Congress has
Fourteenth Amendment power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment to remedy a
state violation of constitutional right). A third case, Parden,377 U.S. at 196-98 (holding that a state-owned railway was presumed to have waived its immunity under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act), was not read with sufficient generality to be classed
with Union Gas and Fftpatrick as recognizing broad power in Congress.
46 See Union Gas,491 U.S. at 23 (holding that Congress may, under the commerce
power, abrogate the Eleventh Amendment by imposing liability upon a state, if it does
so in a clear statement in the language of the statute); cf. Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (creating the clear statement requirement for congressional abrogations of state Eleventh Amendment immunity).
47 See, e.g., Atascadero,473 U.S. at 261 (Brennan,J., dissenting); County of Oneida
v. Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 254 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting in part);
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 125 (1983) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 687 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Employees v. Mo. Dep't of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Brennan,J, dissenting); Yeomans v. Kentucky, 423 U.S. 983, 984 (1975) (BrennanJ., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
48 See Justice Scalia's appraisal ofJustice Brennan's shift in position, Union Gas,
491 U.S. at 35-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting):
Justice BRENNAN's plurality opinion purports to assume the validity of
Hans,and yet reaches the result that CERCLA's imposition of monetary liability is constitutional because Congress has the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity in the exercise of its Commerce Clause power. Justice
WHITE, who not merely assumes the validity of Hans but actually believes in
it, agrees with that disposition.
49 See id. at 14-15. Of this concession, Justice Scalia, dissenting in Union Gas,
snappishly remarked, "IfHans means only that federal-question suits for money damages against the States cannot be brought in federal court unless Congress clearly says
so, it means nothing at all .... " Id. at 36.
50 See Parden, 377 U.S. at 189-90 (Brennan, J.).
If Congress made the judgment that, in view of the dangers of railroad work
and the difficulty of recovering for personal injuries under existing rules,
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But in Union Gas the best Justice Brennan could do was to try once
more to establish a clear power of abrogation in Congress. And so
formidable were Justice Brennan's powers that some two decades after
the demise of the Warren Court he was still able to persuade four of
his brethren to go along, at least with the result.
In Union Gas, Justice Brennan could rely to some extent on a
prior case squarely finding power in Congress to trump the Eleventh
Amendment, the old Burger Court case of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer.51 The
improbable author of Fitzpatrick had been (then) Justice Rehnquist.
Fitzpatrick held that Congress could override the Eleventh Amendment when acting under its Fourteenth Amendment power.512 Section
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress "power to enforce, by
appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." 3 Justice Brennan, writing in Union Gas, reasoned that one could not meaningfully
distinguish the commerce power from the Fourteenth Amendment
power which Fitzpatrickhad recognized.5 4 It is true, as Justice Rehnquist noted in Fitzpatrick, that the Fourteenth Amendment is in terms
an assertion of national power over the states,5 5 and this perhaps
could not as readily be said of the Commerce Clause. On the other
hand, if one reads the Tenth Amendment with the Darby case5 6 it is
railroad workers in interstate commerce should be provided with the right of
action created by the FELA, we should not presume to say, in the absence of
express provision to the contrary, that it intended to exclude a particular
group of such workers from the benefits conferred by the Act. To read a
"sovereign immunity exception" into the Act would result, moreover, in a
right without a remedy; it would mean that Congress made "every" interstate
railroad liable in damages to injured employees but left one class of such
employees-those whose employers happen to be state owned-without any
effective means of enforcing that liability. We are unwilling to conclude that
Congress intended so pointless and frustrating a result. We therefore read
the FELA as authorizing suit in a Federal District Court against state-owned
as well as privately owned common carriers by railroad interstate commerce.
Id. In Alden, Justice Kennedy identified Pardenas "among the first" cases in which the
question had arisen whether Congress could impose statutory liability upon a state.
Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 744 (1999).
51 427 U.S. 445, 456-57 (1976) (holding that, subject to a clear statement rule,
Congress has power to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment to remedy a state violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment).
52 Id
53 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
54 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 16-17.
55 See Fitzpatrick,427 U.S. at 454-55.
56 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1942) (StoneJ,) ("Our conclusion [under the Commerce Clause] is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment ...
[which] states but a truism that all is retained which has not been surrendered.").
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hard to doubt it. As ChiefJustice Marshall early explained, "The powers of the Union, on the great subjects of war, peace, and commerce,
and on many others, are in themselves limitations of the sovereignty
of the States .... ."57 In Union Gas, arguing rather persuasively that, in
any event, Congress's Article I remedial power needed to extend as far
as its Article I substantive power,58 Justice Brennan touched on the
fact that the states are commercial actors on the largest scale. 39 To
strip Congress of power to control state activities affecting interstate
commerce would undermine the commerce power altogether. In
other words, the Eleventh Amendment needed to be parsed to conform to our understandings of the Tenth. 60 In Union Gas itself, the
violation was one of environmental law, and the state stood before the
6x
Court as a major polluter.
The fragility of Union Gas as precedent was obvious from the out62
set.
The opinion for the Court, in its operative portion, wras only a
plurality opinion. 63 And Justice Scalia, for one, clearly signaled that
he would take the first opportunity to overrule Union Gas.64 Seven
years later, only five years after Justice Brennan's body lay in state in

the Supreme Court building, the now-consolidated Rehnquist Court,
freed from the influence ofJustice Brennan's intellect (and from Justice Brennan's uncanny facility in finding Rehnquist-Court majorities
57 The Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 382 (1821).
58 See Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 20-21.
59 See id. at 22.
60 For interesting discussion of this relation, see, e.g., George D. Brown, State
Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Surhed the Death of the
Tenth: Some BroaderImplications ofAtascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 71 CEo. L.
363 (1989); and Calvin . Massey, State Sovereignty and the Tenth and Elevanth Amendments, 56 U. CH. L. REV. 61 (1989).
61 On this aspect of the case, see William D. Araiza, Alden v. Maine and the Web of
Environmental Law, 33 Loy. LA. L. REV. 1513 (2000).
62 See, eg., Chavez v. Arte Publico Press, 59 F.3d 539, 544 (5th Cir. 1995) ("Justice
White's concurrence must be taken on its face to disavow" the plurality's theory);
Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 11 F.3d 1016, 1027 (11th Cir. 1994) (stating thatJustice
White's "vague concurrence renders the continuing validity of Union Gas in doubt.").
63 Justice Brennan announced the judgment of the Union Gas Court and delivered the opinion of the Court with respect to Parts I and 11 of the opinion, in vhich
Justice Scalia joined Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens to form a majority.
Union Gas,491 U.S. at 5. But the operative part of the opinion ims Part III, in which
only Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined. Id. Justice White did file an
opinion in which he concurred in part, creating a majority for Part III, but he distanced himself from the reasoning of the plurality opinion. See id. at 45.
64 See Justice Scalia's subsequent opinion in Hoffinan v. Connedficut Department of
Income Maintenance,492 U.S. 96, 105 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that the
bankruptcy power does not authorize Congress to abrogate the Eleventh Amendment
immunity of a state).
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for his Warren-Court views), seized an early opportunity to overrule
Union Gas. This was accomplished in Seminole Tribe.6 5 After all, Union
Gas had not really answered the nagging question, how Congress
could, by mere legislation, override anything in the Constitution.
Writing for the Court in Seminole Tribe, Chief Justice Rehnquist was
quick to dispatch Union Gas.66 But he did not cast doubt upon Fitzpatrick, his own earlier case. Rather, he used Fitzpatrick to distinguish
Union Gas. Seminole Tribe left intact Congress's Fourteenth Amend67
ment power to trump the Eleventh Amendment.

In part, Fitzpatrickhad been based on a rather simplistic chronological argument. The Fourteenth Amendment happened after the

Eleventh, and so its Section 5 grant of power to Congress could be
read as authorizing Congress to modify the Eleventh. More fundamentally, the Fourteenth Amendment clearly was intended to effect "a
vast transformation"6 of the balance between state and federal powers, and thus its fifth section could be read as part of that great transformation. Justice Scalia distinguished Fitzpatrick on both grounds in

his Union Gas dissent. 69 Responding to this, Justice Brennan had
some fun with the dissent's eagerness to read the Eleventh Amendment expansively based on background understandings about sover-

eign immunity. Those were the background "postulates" that "limit
and control," as the Supreme Court once famously said in another
Eleventh Amendment case, Principalityof Monaco v. Mississippi.70 Very

well. But then, Justice Brennan argued, the Commerce Clause,
though preceding the Eleventh Amendment, clearly came after those
background "postulates. '71 So the commerce power could trump
65 Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 74-76 (1996) (striking down a provision of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act authorizing federal suit by a tribe against a
state to compel performance of the state's statutory duty of good faith negotiation),
For a very few among the writings on Seminole Tribe, see, for example, Laura S. Fitz-gerald, Beyond Marbury:JurisdictionalSef-Dealing in Seminole Tribe, 52 VAND. L. RLv. 407
(1999); Ellen D. Katz, StateJudges,State Officers, and Federal Commands after Seminole

Tribe and Printz, 1998 Wis. L. REv. 1465; Andrew I. Gavil, Seminole Tribe and the
Creeping Refmergence of "DualFederalism," 23 OHIo N.U. L. REV. 1393 (1997); and
Gordon G. Young, Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 56 MD. L. REv. 1411 (1997).
66 See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-67.
67

See id. at 59.

68 The quotation here is from Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); see
also, to similar effect, South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 308 (1966), and Ex
parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-48 (1880).
69 See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 41-42 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
70 292 U.S. 313, 322 (1934).
71 Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 18-19.
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them. Brennan tossed this off very lightly. As a legal argument its only
merit was that it met the opposition's chronological point. But in Seminole Tribe, ChiefJustice Rehnquist apparently had no ready answer to
it. Not until Alden would the Court bury this piece of sophistical
hand-waving. Yes, the Alden Court acknowledged, the background understandings of state sovereign immunity did indeed precede the Constitution. But they also survived it.2
Obviously the rule of Hans v. Louisiana, barring federal claims
against a state in federal court, obstructs the enforcement of federal
law. Now recall that constitutional claims almost imariably have to be
claims against government. And recall that Fitzpatrickdoes not, by itself, authorize suit against a state for a constitutional violation. Instead, Fitzpatrick requires Congress to authorize it; there must be a
clear statutory abrogation of Eleventh Amendment immunity. The
consequence is that, in the silence of Congress-postponing for one
moment the possibility of an officer suit under the doctrine of Exparte
Youngv3-federal courts indeed may not impose even constitutional
norms upon the states.74 After Alden, state court remedial powers are
equally impaired.
B. Ex parte Young

Ex parte Young is the great case to which we trace our modern
confidence that a federal injunction may issue against a state official
acting or threatening to act in violation of the ConstitutionY.7 In
72 SeeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 712-30 (1999). This unedif)ingsquabble was
an artifact of the old canon that when two statutes seem to conflict, later statutes may
be presumed to modify earlier ones. Such abstract reasoning is fated to be deployed
at a remove from whatever actually is motivating the reasoner.
73 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See the next segment of this Article for an introductory
discussion.
74 I have not canvassed all federal civil rights statutes to determine whether any
are exclusively grounded on the commerce power, if that is so, it is an additional
factor to be taken into account in assessing the Alden/Seminole impairment of national
policy75 Today Young also lies to remedy government violations of statutes. But Young
was limited in PennhurstState School & Hospitalv. Haldennan, 465 U.S. 89, 121 (1984)
(holding that federal courts could not enjoin state officials for %iolationsof state law).
Another important modern qualification of Young is that the injunction may not issue
if the defendant is a prosecutor, and the injunction would enjoin her from continuing to litigate a pending state criminal prosecution. See Younger v. Harris,401 U.S.
37, 43-54 (1971). For thorough coverage of the Youngerdoctrine and its refinements,
see WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 25, at 695-745. FExparte Young's equitable
remedy protects only against future or ongoing harms. This element of prospectivity
was refined in Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 660 (1974) (holding that E:parteYoung
could not ground actions against a state for arrearages of benefits due, on tie reason-
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Young, the Court perceived for the first time that a threatened or
ongoing constitutional wrong need not be trespassory to be actionable. 76 The author of Exparte YoungwasJustice Peckham, who was also
the author of that most under-appreciated of Supreme Court opinions-Lochner v. New York. 77 Young must have been intended to furnish the remedial counterpart of Lochner. Justice Peckham's concern
in both cases was to establish a basis for challenging what the Court at
that time considered to be unreasonable state regulation of enterprise. And in General Oil Co. v. Crain, the Court thought that the requirement of due process must open state courts to an Ex parte Young
officer suit as well, in cases arising under federal law, if federal courts
78
were unavailable.
The upshot today is that, whether in civil rights suits proper or in
business litigation challenging the constitutionality of state regulation,
one seeking an injunction against state violations of federal statutory
or constitutional law generally can drop the state out of the picture
altogether and sue the relevant official instead. Of necessity, the Ex
parte Young action is an action against the official in her official
capacity.

Exparte Younglives in equity. Youngis useless if the needed remedy is damages. It is useless even in equity if the prayer is for an order
for money on account of past wrongs. 79 Young offers relief for future
or ongoing harms only. And because equity acts only in personam, the
ing that such moneys would be tantamount to damages from the state treasury, retrospective relief clearly barred by the Eleventh Amendment). For the effect of Edelman
on the plaintiffs in Alden, see infra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
76 See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 152-53. This insight can convert a contract
claim into a constitutional tort and enables a court to order an official to execute
payment of monies the state owes or will owe. Today this important power is compromised by the doctrine of Edelman v. Jordan.

77 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). The only thing wrong with Lodner
was the Court's fatuity in not understanding the effect on a contract of unequal bargaining power. Lochner was quite right that Americans must have a right to contract,
certainly as to their labor, as the Thirteenth Amendment makes clear; and after The
Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873) (gutting the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment), the only available general textual location was the liberty language of the Due Process Clause. Liberals ought to take
Lochner at last to their bosoms as the fount of claims it really was. Cf Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (McReynolds, J.) (relying on Lochner; recognizing
familial, contractual, and other unenumerated rights of substantive due process).
78 Gen. Oil Co. v Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 230-31 (1908).
79 See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 660 (holding that Ex pare Young could not ground
actions against a state for arrearages of benefits due, on the reasoning that such moneys would be tantamount to damages from the state treasury, retrospective relief long
held barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
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defendant official must be in a position to carry out court orders to
conform the government's conduct to law.
This, then, is the still-evolving but traditional,, "officer suit" of
Anglo-American law. Given the Eleventh Amendment as read in Hans
v. Louisiana,the rule of law in this country would be severely compromised without it. My august late colleague, Charles Alan Wright, told
me that he used to say, in concluding a lecture on Ex parte Young, "Ex
parte Young is what enables us to enforce the Constitution against the
states. We must cherish it." At present we are not doing a very good
job of cherishing it,81 but the "officer suit" for an injunction remains
the effective mode of private enforcement of law against government.
C. The Diversity Theoiy Controversy
In the last quarter of the twentieth century the position that we
have been examining became somewhat fluid as the legacy of the
uniquely liberal Warren CourtS2 gave way to steadily conservativejudi80 Among the more celebrated precursor cases, see Marbuzy v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I
Cranch) 137 (1803) (federal official), and Osborn v. Bank of the UnitcdStates,22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738 (1824). Youngs chief advance over these forebears lies in Justice
Peckham's insight that the threatened violation need not be trespassory. In other
words, he saw, albeit in equity, the modem idea of constitutional tort. "The difference between an actual and direct interference with tangible property and die enjoining of state officers from enforcing an unconstitutional act, is not of a radical
nature, and does not extend, in truth, the jurisdiction of the courts over the subjectmatter." Ex parteYoung, 209 U.S. at 167.
81 See, e-g., Mathias v%WorldCom Technologies, Inc., 121 S. CL 122. (2001)
(granting certiorari in part to consider whether an r parte )1ungaction will lie
against state commissioners for alleged violations of federal law in their consensual
implementation of a federal regulatory program under the federal Telecommunications Act of 1996). See also Justice Kennedy's naive assault on Thungin Idaho . Corur
dAlene Tribe; 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997), and see infra notes 330-32 and accompanying
text. Justice Kennedy's understanding of the Youngaction at the time of CoeurdSAlene
was incomplete. Young is an official capacity suit or it is nothing. The solution to the
problem of the officer suit as an individual capacity suit, the problem presented in In
reAyers, 123 U. S. 443 (1887), ought to have been a court order to ie official, not to
pay out of his own pocket, but to execute the state's payment in his official capacity.
Edelman v.Jordan,415 U.S. at 660, debarring court-ordered past payments, while limiting the remedy, did not convert Young into an individual capacity action. In Seninoe
Tribe, Ex parte Young was disapproved on a theory culled from another context, that
Congress had provided instead a comprehensive remedial scheme. One must consult
the remedial scheme in Seminole Tribe to enjoy the full flavor of this trope. Seegeneral y
Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the PotentialEvisceration
of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. RExV. 495 (1997).
82 But see LucAs A. PowaE, THE WARREN COURT AND AMEIucAN Po-rrcis (2000)
(making the case that the Warren Court tended to follow rather than lead mainstream American opinion).
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cial appointments. In that time of change a great new scholarly de83
bate arose over Hans v. Louisiana.

A century earlier, Hans v. Louisiana had read the Eleventh
Amendment to exempt state government from the rule of law in federal courts.8 4 Although Justice Bradley, the author of Hans,was somewhat apologetic about this judicial abdication, 5 he effected this
enormity without explanation.8 6 Bradley could not have understood
just how improvident this ruling was. In that day, the only considerable item of federal judicial enforcement as against a state was the Contracts Clause.8 7 Hanswas handed down just before the dawning of the
age of federal legislation and well before the modern development of
rights-based constitutional jurisprudence. A the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment began to assume its now familiar substantive dimension, and-after the New Deal period-the Court began to confront a new and ever enlarging mass of federal statutes and
regulations, the Ex parte Young officer suit took on its modern centrality. But Young notwithstanding, the Court must have begun to see
that Hanswas a debilitating anachronism that needed to be overruled.
The Warren Court expanded rights-based litigation, but failed to put

paid to Hans.8 8 The closest it came to the question, in the Parden

case, was to confer presumptive power upon Congress to impose liabil83

134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment protects states even

from suits brought within the federal-questionjurisdiction of federal courts by citizens

of the same state).
84 Id. at 20-21.
85 "To avoid misapprehension," Bradley wrote,
it may be proper to add that, although the obligations of a State rest for their
performance upon its honor and good faith, and cannot be made the subjects of judicial cognizance unless the State consents to be sued, or comes
itself into court; yet where property or rights are enjoyed under a grant or
contract made by a State, they cannot wantonly be invaded. Whilst the State
cannot be compelled by suit to perform its contracts, any attempt on its part
to violate property or rights acquired under its contracts, may be judicially
resisted; and any law impairing the obligation of contracts under which such
property or rights are held is void and powerless to affect their enjoyment.
I&
86 See id. at 21 ("It is not necessary that we should enter upon an examination of
the reason or expediency of the rule which exempts a sovereign State from prosecution in a court ofjustice at the suit of individuals."). For a contextual explanation, see
infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
87 See Hans, 134 U.S. at 20-21.

88 The chance was presented in Parden v. Terminal Railway, 377 U.S. 184, 196-98
(1964) (holding that state employers do not have Eleventh Amendment immunity in
actions under the Federal Employers' Liability Act). See supra notes 43, 50.
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ity upon the states.89 As the Burger and Rehnquist Courts labored to
place new constraints upon Ex parte Young,90 the academic debate began to sound a note of urgency.
The Amendment speaks literally only to diversity cases, in which
federal questions occur only fortuitously. From the left it w-s argued
that the Eleventh Amendment should not have any bearing at all
upon actions enforcing federal law. The difficulty for this pro-enforcement position was that, as Justice Bradley had put it long ago in
Hans,it seemed to lead to an "anomaly": "[Iln cases arising under the
Constitution or laws of the United States, a State may be sued in the
federal courts by its own citizens; though it cannot be sued for a like
cause of action by the citizens of other States, or of a foreign state
. *..."91
The short answer to this, of course, is that the Amendment
should never have had any application to federal claims at all, even in
diversity cases. The supposed "anomaly" was no more substantial than
a pricked bubble.
From the right, the diversity part of the text was discounted in
favor of blanket immunity. This was not difficult to do because when
it comes to the Eleventh Amendment, the strict constructionist ideal
long ago vanished from the otherwise conservative consciousness. For
example, the Amendment has long been held to bar federal actions
against a state by a foreign country, although such suits are not mentioned by the Amendment. 9 2 The immunity also extends to federal
actions by sovereign Native American tribes. 93 The Amendment is
read to bar not only federal actions against a state by citizens of another state, but by its own citizens, in cases arising under federal lawthe principle of Hans v. Louisiana. Moreover, although the Amendment speaks only to actions "in law or equity," it is read to bar actions
against a state in admiralty. 94 And, of course, after Alden, rules analo-

gous to these apply in state courts, too, although the text of the Elev89 Parden,377 U.S. at 195-96. Parden,however, was cited for the proposition that
a state could be deemed to have constructively waived its immunity by participation in
a federal program. See, eg., Coll. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 679-80 (1999) (disapproving the "constructive .a-fiv
ce doctrine of Parden). Pardenfit this description only in the sense that, by owning a railway
and employing workers, the state had put itself within the terms of the statute. Sec
Parden, 377 U.S. at 196-98. Thus, Parden claimed all the ground Justice Brennan
reclaimed in Union Gas. Neither case succeeded in overruling Han&
90

91
92
93
Native
94

See supra note 75.

Hans, 134 U.S. at 10.
See, eg., Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 329-32 (1934).
See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 287-88 (1997); Blatchford .
Vll. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 781-82 (1991).
ExparteNewYork, 256 U.S. 490, 497-500 (1921).
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enth Amendment refers only to "[t] he Judicial power of the United
States."9 5 These are only the more prominent extensions of the text.
Alden is only the most recent of egregious examples.
Not that the tension between these broad readings on the one
hand, and the exigencies of constitutional structure and the rule of
law on the other, have failed to produce exceptions as well. There are
cases in which an action against a state is permitted notwithstanding
the language of the Eleventh Amendment, which does not seem to
make room for them. Falling into this category are petitions for Supreme Court review of state-court cases in which the judgment has
been for the state-most importantly, cases affirming criminal convictions. Supreme Court review of such cases was saved early on by Chief
Justice Marshall, in his great opinion in The Cohens v. Virginia.9'1
There could be no other view consistent with the Supremacy Clause
and constitutional structure, as Marshall explained. 9 7 In Martin v.
Hunter'sLessee,98 Justice Story had made an analogous argument from
the Supremacy Clause in cases between private parties. In The Cohens,
ChiefJustice Marshall reasoned that state sovereign immunity in statecourt cases raising federal questions for Supreme Court review had
been waived when the states submitted themselves to the Constitution
"in the plan of the Convention." 99 To hold otherwise, he wrote,
would be to "prostrate ... the government and its laws at the feet of
every State in the Union." 10 0 The Eleventh Amendment, Marshall insisted, was intended only to protect the states from suits by nonresident creditors, not "to strip the government of the means of
protecting, by the instrumentality of its Courts, the constitution and
laws from active violation." 10 1
95

U.S. CONsT. amend. XI; see supra note 12.

96

19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 407-10 (1821).

97

Id. at 381-82.

98 14 U.S. (1Wheat.) 304 (1816) (sustaining the constitutionality of the Supreme
Court's statutory jurisdiction to review state court decisions of federal questions,
based on the Supremacy Clause and the implications of the Madisonian compromise
by which lower federal courts were not established by the Constitution, but put in the
power of Congress).
99 This is Alexander Hamilton's formulation, from THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 529
(Edward Mead Earle ed., 1940). See The Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 419-20 (quoting THE FEDERALIST).
100 The Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 385.
101 Id. at 407. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), ChiefJustice Jay
had taken the same position, arguing that the states lost their sovereign immunity
when they submitted themselves to the Constitution. Id. at 471. For an inquiry into
why both Hans and Alden relied on justice Iredell's dissent in Chisholm rather than the
majority opinion, see Merico-Stephens, supranote 15, at 351-52. The short answer to
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Other notable exceptions include the rule that the United States
may come into its own courts to sue a state, notwithstanding the Eleventh Amendment. 0 2 In addition, the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is held unaffected by the Eleventh Amendment in
actions between states,' 0 3 although the Court has barred actions between states when the plaintiff state is not the real party in interest,
but files suit on behalf of its individual resident creditors.'l 4 It is also
hoped, from the left, that there may be a proprietary or market-participation exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity,t05 just as there
is under the federal Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.10G Indeed, a
commercial-transaction exception to the Alden rules would have saved
the Alden plaintiffs' case, or at least made it more difficult for the
Rehnquist Court not to. It is also sometimes argued that an action
against the state will lie for compensation for the wrongful taking of
specific property. 0 7 Then, too, of course, we know that an action will
lie against a state officer for an injunction against a threatened or

this is probably that the Eleventh Amendment put paid to Chishon. The majority's
position in Chisholm still works only if, like the first Justice Harlan, one believes
Chisholm was rightly decided.
102 United States v. Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965); United States V.
Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643-45 (1892). But cf. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 446-48
(1900) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment bars a federal suit against a state by a
federal corporation).
103 See Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 731 (1838).
104 New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76, 91 (1883).
105

Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824), is

sometimes cited for this proposition. But see Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 539-40 (1985) (Blackmun,J.) (arguing that in adjudicating slate

employment practices the distinction between governmental and non-governmental
functions was not administrable).
106 Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 § 4, 28 U.S.C. § 1605 (1994) (lifting
foreign sovereign immunity for acts arising out of nongovernmental conduct occurring in this country or with direct effects in this country).
107 Se e.g., United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 204, 220-23 (1882) (sustaining the
Lee family's claim against the United States for wrongful confiscation of Arlington,
the family seat). This position seemed undercut by Larson v. Domestic & Fordgn Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949). But in FloridaDepartment of State v. TreasureSalvors,
Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 688-91 (1982), the Court, perJustice Stevens, ruled that the Elev-

enth Amendment did not bar an admiralty suit against state officials in their official
capacity for the return of artifacts discovered by the plaintiffs in undersea exploration. The Supreme Court relied on Lee and suggested that Larson and Lee together
mean that relief may not run against the state treasury. For recent developments
undercutting this line of argument, see infra notes 301-26 and accompanying text.
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ongoing violation of federal law by the state-the principle of the
great case of Ex parte Young los

But why was the language of the Eleventh Amendment itself so
oddly tied to diversity cases? We know that Congress passed the Eleventh Amendment to override the 1793 case of Chisholm v. Georgia.l''
In that case, it was held that the state of Georgia must stand and defend a state-law action on the contract by a nonresident creditor. 1t
The Court could see no constitutional principle that would immunize
a debtor state in a case of that kind.1 1 ' The sound credit of a state in
those days was an item of strong national policy. 1 12 But with the ruling in Chisholm, the states saw their scant revenues flowing out of state
to unloved bankers in Boston or Glasgow. Georgia's outrage was
shared by sister states" a3 still struggling under their own burdens of
debt."x4 With the Eleventh Amendment, Congress simply overrode
108 Sometimes it is said that if a state official acts ultra vires, completely beyond
her state-law powers, a federal injunction is available. See Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731,
735-36 (1947). A plurality of the Court relied on this concept in FloridaDepartment of
State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. at 689. But in PennhurstState School & Hospitalv.
Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), the Court, per Justice Powell, spoke of this "exception" as operable, if at all, only when a state officer acts "without any authority
whatever." Id. at 101 n.1 1 (quoting TreasureSalvors, 458 U.S. at 697). Otherwise, Justice Powell pointed out, a plaintiff could always lift the bar of the Eleventh Amendment by pleading some violation of state, as well as federal, law. Id. at 121.
109 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
110 Chisholm was a citizen of South Carolina. Id. at 420.
111 Id. at 479.
112 The United States's assumption of the states' Revolutionary War debts furnishes some support for this view. So also does Article III's authorization of federal
suit by a nonresident against a state. For the view that Article III contemplated state
responsibility for future indebtedness, not existing indebtedness, see, recently, James
E. Pfander, History and State Suability: An "Explanatory"Account of the Eleventh Amend.
ment, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1269, 1306-08 (1998). Similarly, the Contracts Clause ftr-

nishes some evidence in support of the assertion in the text, whether one reads it as
protecting resident creditors from debtor relief laws or as protecting creditors generally from state repudiations of public debt. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 provides:
No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any
Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill
of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
113 On the reaction of the country to Chisholm, see 5 THE DocuMENT ARYHISTORY
OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800: SUITS AGAINST SrAtns
127-273 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1994) (containing papers filed and arguments in, as well
as contemporaneous commentary on, Chisholm v. Georgia).
114 The Continental Congress had no means of obtaining revenue except through
requisitions on the states. During the Revolution, to meet Congress's requisitions for
the army and to provide for their own independent militias, the states incurred fur-
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Chisholm on its diversity/state law facts.1 15 On its face the Amendment

is only about the diversity grants in Article M, Section 2; 16 indeed, it
is couched merely as a rule of construction for cases falling within
those heads of diversity jurisdiction. Read literally, the Amendment
reflects no intention to interfere with cases arising under federal law,
and ChiefJustice Marshall so read it in The Cohens.11 7 It can be supposed, in this view, that the Amendment did not more distinctly come
to the rescue of the federal-question jurisdiction of federal courts because there was no such jurisdiction at the time and therefore no
point in rescuing it. Federal trial courts had no general federal-question jurisdiction until 1875.118 This last argument, however, cuts two
ways. In Seminole Tribe, the absence of federal-question jurisdiction
when the Eleventh Amendment was adopted was thought to excuse the
failure of the Amendment to immunize the state in nondiversity

ther debts. The wvar debts authorized by Congress were assumed by the Confederation in Article XII of the Articles of Confederation; the debts of the Confederation, in
turn, were assumed by the United States in Article VI of the Constitution. U.S.
CONST. art VI, § 1; ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XII. As to the state debts of the
revolutionary period that had not been authorized by Congress, Alexander Hamilton,
as first Secretary of the Treasury, recognized them as ur debts; and tinder his financial plan the nationhl government, now able to impose imposts on foreign goods,
more or less assumed those debts in 1790. S&e FoRREST McDouD, ALE.,NDER Rmt.
181-88 (1982) (on the 1790 assumption and funding of the enILTON: A BIOGRAPitire domestic debt under Hamilton's plan). It remained a concern of the states to
avoid payment of certain remaining war and post-war obligations. For example, states
had confiscated properties of loyalists, who showed up to claim them. The famous
example is Virginia's escheat of the Fairfax Estate, the bone of contention in the great
case of Martin v. Hunter'sLessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
115 In Chishlwm, a citizen of South Carolina as suing Georgia in assumpsit to collect a debt. The action was brought in the Supreme Court. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 420'
(argument for the plaintiff).
116 U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2 provides:
The judicial Power shall extend to... Controversies between two or more
States;--between a State and Citizens of another State;-between Citizens of
different States;-between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under
Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and
foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
117 The Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 407 (1821); see supra notes
96-99 and accompanying text.
118 Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codifed as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1994)). I set to one side the abortive attempt of die last Federalist Congress
to vest federal-question jurisdiction at the time of the constitutional crisis over the
,
election of 1800. See Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch. 4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92 rpraledb Act of
Mar. 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132.
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cases.' 9 In Alden, Justice Kennedy read the narrowness of the text as
reflecting the narrowness of the breach that Chisholm had made in the
solid wall of preexisting understandings that the states were im-

mune.

20

Moreover, Justice Kennedy argued, "As the Amendment

clarified the only provisions of the Constitution that anyone had suggested might support a contrary understanding, there was no reason
2
to draft with a broader brush." '

The foregoing is a crude general introduction to the debate over
the "diversity" theory, so-called, of the Eleventh Amendment. The
theory has had overwhelming academic support.'2 2 Under this theory, federal law should have been fully enforceable against the states
from the beginning, in the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts as
well as in state courts. Federal law should have become generally enforceable in actions against states in federal courts with Congress's
1875 grant to federal courts of original general jurisdiction over cases
arising under federal law.' 23 Throughout the post-Reconstruction period the Supreme Court is seen reviewing actions to force Southern
states to pay their debts in diversity cases, in actions under the Contracts Clause as well as in state-law actions on the contract.' 2 4 But as
Professor Orth argues, with the Hayes-Tilden Compromise of 1877,
Northern troops had to pull out of the South, and as a practical matter federal law became unenforceable against the Southern states. 1 5
119

Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 69-70 (1996) (Rehnquist, CJ.):
The text dealt in terms only with the problem presented by the decision in
Chisholm; in light of the fact that the federal courts did not have federalquestion jurisdiction at the time the Amendment was passed (and would not
have it until 1875), it seems unlikely that much thought was given to the
prospect of federal-question jurisdiction over the States.
120 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 723-24 (1999).
121 Id.at 724.
122 E.g., William A. Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261 (1989); Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the
Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102 HARv.L. REV. 1342 (1989); Vicki C. Jackson, The
Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 98 YALE LJ. 1
(1988); William A. Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction,35 STm. L. RE-v. 1033 (1983);JohnJ. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,83 COLuM. L. REV. 1889 (1983).

123 Act of Mar. 3,1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470 (codifed as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1994)).
124 See, e.g., Bd. of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531 (1875) (officer suit). See
generallyJohn Orth, The Fame and Name of Louisiana: The Eleventh Amendment and the
End of Reconstruction, 2 TUL. L. REV. 11 (1980).

125

JOHN V. ORTH, THE JUDICAL POWER OF THE UNITED STATES: TiE ELL'.tVNT i

AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN

HISTORY 55-57 (1987) (arguing that with the withdrawal of
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The Court began to permit the states to plead the Eleventh Amendment even in diversity cases raising federal constitutional claims' 26
and eventually even in true federal-question cases brought in the new
post-1875 federal-question jurisdiction. 2 7 This last development, of
course, occurred in the case of Hans v. Louisiana.'2 8 In this way the
Court gave up on its long struggle to make the Southern states pay
position was nailed down in
their debts. 12 9 The newly pusillanimous
30
Louisiana.1
v.
Hans
of
case
fateful
the
The "diversity" theorists continue to think Hans wrong. They
think that the Eleventh Amendment should be read as covering only
cases like Chisholm, cases pleaded under state law. Once restored to
this natural reading, the Amendment would leave the states with the
general common-law immunity that is appropriate to them. But nothing in the Amendment, and certainly nothing in state sovereign immunity law, would inhibit the enforcement of federal law against the
states in either set of courts. 13 1

federal troops under the Hayes/Tilden Compromise of 1877, Southern state indebtedness became judicially unenforceable as a practical matter, and relating this development to the emergence of the rule of Hans v. Louisiana).
126

See, eg., In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507-08 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117

U.S. 52, 69-71 (1886); Louisiana .. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 726-28 (1882).
127 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890).
128

See i&

129 Civil War debts were not the issue; under the Fourteenth Amendment, those
were repudiated. But it appears that in the postwar South there was a strong belief
that issuing state bonds for railway construction would yield progress and economic
development. With the panic of 1873, Southern states found that they had tken on
insupportable new burdens of debt. The story is told in ERic FoEn.a, Rrcoxsmvuc.
TION: AMERICA's UNFINISHED REVOLTrION 1863-1877, at 383-84 (1988), and briefly
sketched out in William I.Wiecek, "Old Times There Are Not Forgotlen": The Distincheness of the Southern ConstitutionalExperience, in AN UNCERTAIN TPtaomON: Co.xs-rr.
TIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH

159, 184-85 (Kermit L Hall &James IV.

Ely, Jr., eds., 1989).
130 Hans was not the first case to recognize the weakness of the Supreme Court
after the withdrawal of federal troops from the South. Some earlier cases had already
recognized state Eleventh Amendment immunity as against federal claims. But those
cases were still being brought in the diversity jurisdiction of federal courts, nomithstanding the new 1875 grant of federal-question jurisdiction to federal courts. See
cases cited supra note 126. Because of the textual limitations of the Eleventh Amendment, these cases need not have been thought dispositive in Hans. The Amendment,
of course, speaks only to diversity cases. The better result in Hanswould have been to
permit the action to go forward under federal law and to disapprove anything to the
contrary in those cases.
131 In state court, state sovereign immunity should collapse under the weight of
the Supremacy Clause in a case raising a federal claim, an obvious principle con-
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There remain, however, those who cling to the view that not only
was Chisholmutterly wrong when it was decided; but also that the states
would never have ratified the Constitution if it were to cost them their
sovereign immunity in the national courts.' 32 The standard narrative
of proponents of this view is that Chisholm fell on the nation with a
"shock of surprise." 133 This is the "profound shock"1 34 or "sovereign
immunity" theory, of which Hans is the pillar and Alden the capstone.
This thinking has the merit, at least, of seeming to explain the
speed, after Chisholm, with which Congress passed the Eleventh
Amendment. 3 5
Some historians will tell you, however, that if any Eleventh
Amendment case should have been surprising, it was not Chisholm, but
Hans. To be sure, federal claims had been dismissed under the Eleventh Amendment before Hans, when Contracts Clause claims were
brought in diversity cases.' 3 6 But in definitively holding the states immune from federal suit in all cases, including nondiversity cases not
covered by the language of the Amendment, Hans confided the enforcement of federal law against a named state to that state's courts.
Chief Justice Marshall, in another context, once considered the propriety of state courts as exclusive forums for those relying on federal
law and quickly dismissed the idea: "When we observe the importance
which [the] constitution attaches to the independence of judges, we
are the less inclined to suppose that it can have intended to leave
these constitutional questions to tribunals where this independence
13 7
may not exist.'
firmed by Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 381-83 (1990), notwithstanding that Howlett
itself involved a claim against a local county rather than the state.
132 See generally Fletcher, The Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply
to Critics, supra note 122; Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Elenth Amendment, supra

note 122. For a critique of the diversity theory, see William P. Marshall, The Diversity
Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A CriticalEvaluation, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1372 (1989).

133 The "shock of surprise" language comes from Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 11
(1890) (Bradley, J.), and is repeated in Principalityof Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S.
313, 325 (1934) (Hughes, C.J.).
134 The "profound shock" language is that of I CHARLES WARREN, TIE StURtNit:
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96 (rev. ed. 1926). On the speed of enactment of
the Eleventh Amendment and the immediacy of its effect, see Hollingsworth v. Virginia,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
135

But see Pfander, History and State Suability, supra note 112, at 1342-43 (arguing

that the states' expectations of immunity from federal suit was only as to the debts
that existed in 1787). In this view, the states expected to answer for their after-acquired indebtedness.
136 See cases cited supra note 126.
137 The'Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 387 (1821) (Marshall, CJ.).
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Take That, Henry Hart!

Of all the mistakes that have been made under the Eleventh
Amendment, Hans v. Louisianawas the big one. Yet even under Hans,
and even though, as John Marshall's remark illustrates, the adequacy
of the state forum has been doubted, the theoretical existence of a state
forum for federal claims against the states has not been doubted for
over a century. Indeed, because Congress has power to strip the inferior federal courts of jurisdiction, the state courts have rightly been
perceived, whatever their disadvantages, as the ultimate bastions of
Americans' liberties against government. This was the resonant conclusion of Henry Hart, in his celebrated Dialogue, read by generations
of students of the federal courts.l-s It is this treasured last resort that
Alden v. Maine all but denies. And Alden holds Congress powerless to
do anything about it. In so holding, Alden apparently projects the Byzantine jurisprudence of the Eleventh Amendment onto the state
courts. I will come back to this problem of the vanishing state forum

for federal claims.' 3 9 But we are now prepared, and it

Rill
now be

convenient, to examine Alden more directly.

II. THE WAGES
A.

OF FEDERALISM

FiscalFancies: Little Luxuries and StaggeringBurdens

It will be useful at this point to ring in the little problem of the
state fisc. A consideration for the Alden Court seemed to be the unreasonableness of permitting "raids" on a state's treasury. 140 Justice
Kennedy there offered some of the best policy arguments about this
to be found in the law reports. Most notably, he pointed out that by
imposing or withholding the staggering burdens of litigation, Congress could gain "a power and a leverage over the States that is not
contemplated by our constitutional design."""1 State treasuries, of
course, have long been at the heart of Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. Money damages against a state have been unavailable in federal courts since the Eleventh Amendment. Moreover, the Court held
in 1974 in Edelman v. Jordan'42 that even Ex parte Young" 43 could not
138 See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Lirnit the Jzrisdidion of Federal
Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HAmv. L. REV. 1362, 1401 (1953).

139 See infra notes 244-48 and accompanying text.
140 See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 719-21 (1999) (describing outraged reaction
to Chisiolm); ic at 750 (describing the danger to the autonomy of te states and to
dual federalism posed by state liability).
141

Id.

142 415 U.S. 651 (1974) (Rehnquist, J.).
143 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see supra notes 75-81 and accompanying teXt.
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yield court orders for payment of the past obligations of a state.'
Court orders for arrearages were too much like damages. Such relief
must be prospective only.145 Actually, anybody with a law school diploma should be able to differentiate damages from arrearages of the
kind claimed in Edelman. When the disabled, blind, or elderly are
arbitrarily denied government benefit money on which they rely (the
sort of claim involved in Edelman), and when their claims involve, as
such claims can, lost subsistence, health, roof, family, the damages can
be very large indeed. The lost benefits themselves, on the other hand,
simply consist of that to which prevailing claimants were previously
entitled. Indeed, to the extent the coercive powers of equity in a
given case may be weak, Edelman creates the perverse incentive of allowing the state to go on arbitrarily withholding benefits, forcing the
disabled plaintiff to litigation again and again for statutory rights that
are clear. 14 6 That difficulty aside, surely there is little practical difference between raids on the state treasury in the form of court orders
requiring restitution of withheld benefits and raids on the state treasury in the form of court orders requiring new expenditures. Both
will take the form of unbudgeted current liabilities.
In Alden, Justice Kennedy, describing raids on the treasuy,

seemed to have a vision of petulant plaintiffs, selfishly demanding priority for their frivolous claims over the needs of the state's broader
electorate. "A general federal power," he wrote, "to authorize private
suits for money damages would place unwarranted strain on the
States' ability to govern in accordance with the will of their citizens." 14 7 No doubt civil rights litigation can redirect resources. That
can be a real problem in some cases. But the Alden plaintiffs were not
suing for the kind of seemingly luxurious cosseting that had so offended Justice Kennedy in the then-recent installment of the Kansas
City school case, Missouri v. Jenkins.148 There, the plaintiffs were asking the District Court to order the school board to provide them
with-among other things-a petting farm, a model United Nations
wired for simultaneous translation, and a planetarium. 14 1 Reading
that case one might forget the relation between the demands for
144 Edelman, 415 U.S. at 675-77.
145

Id. at 677.

146 For the predictable occurrence of such social security litigation against "nonacquiescent" officials, see WEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 25, at 358-66, and
materials there cited.
147 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 750-51 (1999).
148 495 U.S. 33 (1990).
149 See id. at 77 (Kennedy, J., concurring); see also Missouri v.Jenkins (III), 515
U.S. 70, 80-83 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (considering the propriety of other, less luxu.
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spending so characteristic these days of school desegregation litigation in its declining phase and the Burger Court's refusal decades
ago-whether wise or unwise-to authorize interdistrict busing. 0°
No longer able to "desegregate" the schools by embracing the white
suburbs in busing decrees-the whiteness of the suburbs, in part, reflecting "white flight" from busing decrees-inner-city school districts
became rapidly resegregated and black. The expenditures plaintiffs
in those districts came to demand and school authorities themselves
to seek were a desperate expedient intended to lure white children
back.'-5 1
A similar problem can be seen in the Gatrett case,15 2 decided just

as I was reviewing the first proofs of this Article. There, ChiefJustice
Rehnquist seemed to take up Justice Kennedy's concern in Alden and
Missouri v. Jenkins, that civil rights claims too often result in orders for
frivolous expenditures not high on the electorate's list of priorities.
In the course of holding that Congress may not subject a state to suit
for discrimination in employment, the ChiefJustice wrote: "[ I ] t would
be entirely rational (and therefore constitutional) for a state employer
to conserve scarce financial resources by hiring employees who are
1 53
able to use existing facilities."
But the Alden plaintiffs, far from demanding special expenditures, were trying to collect their own wages, wages they had worked
for and earned.' 5 4 With all due respect to Justice Kennedy, it cannot
be a legitimate priority of the people of the state to misappropriate
the wages earned by state employees.

rious but expensive improvements); id. at 94 (disapproving the use of "magnet"
schools to attract students from nonviolating districts).
150 See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717,744-45 (1974) (holding, under the Equal
Protection Clause, that courts may not order busing of children from or to a school
district other than their own without a showing of intentional discrimination on the
part of the other district). For a prediction of the then unthinkable retrenchment by
the Court in the school cases, see Louise Weinberg, The New JudicialFederalism, 29
STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1191, 1235-44 (1977).
151 The story of the school desegregation cases is told in WEINBERG, FEnrEuL.
CouRTs, supra note 25, at 879-921.
152 Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S. Ct. 955, 964 (2001) (holding that Congress's
Fourteenth Amendment power is insufficient to overcome state sovereign immunity
in an action under the Americans with Disabilities Act; holding also that discriminations against the disabled are subject only to minimal rational-basis scrutiny).
153 Id. at 966.
154 There was also a statutory claim for "liquidated damages." Alden v. Maine, 527
U.S. 706, 712 (1999).
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In Alden, a class composed of Maine's probation workers were
suing the state for withholding extra pay for overtime.',', The minimum wage for overtime labor, like the generic minimum wage, is set
by federal law-by the Fair Labor Standards Act. 15 6 The overtime
wage is not the minimum wage, or the average wage, or the prevailing
wage. Rather, it is aptly and familiarly described as "time and a
half."'157 Now, someone unfamiliar with the federalism cases might
ask what authorizes Congress to set the wages of state government employees. The immediate answer, putting to one side the whole history
of the commerce power since 1937, is the Garciacase.1 8 It is Garcia
that in our time tears down the supposed Tenth Amendment barrier
to federal labor standards for state employees. 15 9 I raised the fact that

the action in Alden was for earned wages not because of the equities
favoring those employees' particular case-or not only because of the
equities-but also because cases like Alden, for some mysterious reason, remain at the center of so much of the Court's federalism jurisprudence.160 The applicability of the Fair Labor Standards Act was
the point of contention in Usey 161 and in Garcia,and was the point of
contention in Alden. The facts of Alden, in short, seem to be generic
to federalism cases.

155 Id.
156 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994).
157 See id. § 207(e) (7) (setting the wage for overtime).
158 See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 555-56 (1985)
(holding that the Tenth Amendment does not bar Congress from regulating the national labor market even as to state employees) (overruling Nat'l League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), itself overruling Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)).
For a contrarian assertion that it is Garciathat is the bad apple in this barrel, seeJohn
C. Yoo, TheJudicialSafeguards of Federalism,70 S.CAL. L. REv. 1311, 1311 (1997).
159 But see Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 121 S.Ct. 955, 963, 967 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 66-67, 91-92 (2000). See also Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S.
452, 470, 484-85 (1991) (holding, for reasons of federalism, that the Age Discrimination in Employment Act would not be construed to prohibit mandatory retirement of
state judges without a clear statement in the language of the statute).
160 Apart from Alden itself, and Garcia and User--and the great nationalizing
cases of NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), and United States 1).
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941) (overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918))see recently, for example, Kimel v. FloridaBoard ofRegents, 528 U.S. at 91 (reaffirming
the rule of Seminole Tribe to hold, inter alia, that Congress has no commerce power to
abrogate state immunity from private suit in an action under the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act).

161 Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 840 (1976) (overruling Maryland
v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968)).
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Overshooting the Garcia Target

A sticking point for the Court, as for Congress, has been the question whether national labor standards are appropriate in any event. 16FFrom the point of view of, say, a rural employer in the 1930s, it might
have seemed simply unreasonable to be required to pay city-style
money to a rural workforce of largely (at that time) undereducated
rural workers. The New Deal labor laws failed to include many of
those workers, perhaps for that reason. 16 I gave a talk on Alden recently at a conference of state supreme court justices. After the talk
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine-what
luck!-rose to his feet to explain why, in Alden, his court had held the
state immune. The Maine judges were not overly concerned about
their state's sovereign immunity, which was waived for Maine's owm
actions for wages. But they felt strongly that the federal statutory overtime wage, "time-and-a-half," was simply unreasonable when applied
to probation workers in Maine.
It is commonly suggested that the real target of Alden as Carcia.'6 Arguably, Alden is intended to let its inflated Eleventh Amendment analogy do the work of the submerged Tenth Amendment.
After all, the first casualty of restricted enforcement of national policy
is national policy. That is what lends such a note of fatuity to the
Alden Court's suggestion that the states remain subject to federal
law. 6 5 Take the Alden situation itself. Congress concluded that a private cause of action was necessary under the Fair Labor Standards Act;
Congress specifically found that, as a practical matter, the Labor Department could not enforce the statute, given the volume of infractions. 66 If the statute, then, is to be substantially unenforced against
state employers without the private cause of action, national labor policy is weakened in proportion to the states' share of the labor market.
162 Consider the thinking that gave us Hammer v. Dagenhart,247 U.S. 251, 276-77
(1918) (Day, J.) (holding that Congress had insufficient commerce power to prohibit
interstate transportation of the products of child labor). "The goods shipped are of
themselves harmless.... [T]he mere fact that they were intended for interstate commerce transportation does not make their production subject to federal control." Id.
at 272; see also Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 297 (1936) (holding that Congress had insufficient commerce power to bind a mining company to wages and hours
standards that in part were negotiated nationally).
163 See David E. Bernstein, Roots ofthe 'Underdass. TheDeline of LaissezfaireJurispudence and the Rise of Racist Labor Legislation, 43 A.i. U. L REX'. 85, 119 (1993).

164 - See, e.g., Chemerinsky, The Hypocrisv ofAlden, supra note 15, at 1299 ("Ahlen
effectively overrules Garciaand reinstates NationalLeagte of Citics."); Merico-Stephens,
OfMaine's Sovereignit, supra note 15, at 328-29.
165
166

See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).
See id. at 810 (SouterJ., dissenting); S. REP. No. 93-690, at 27 (1974).
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It means very little to say that the states remain subject to federal fair
labor standards. Garciabecomes a paper tiger.
But this view of Alden misses fire, not because Alden is not so bad,
but because Alden is worse. Alden applies to Article I legislation of all
kinds, not merely the Fair Labor Standards Act. Alden truly is a major
development.
III.

THE MAGIC

MouNTAiN: A MYTHcIAL

THEORY OF FEDERALISM

In ruling as it did, the Alden Court was like a mountain climber,
struggling for footholds on a precipitous slope. The case is one long
scrabble for theory. With his cri de coeur on fiscal federalism, Justice
Kennedy reached for a theory of sovereign immunity to support it.
But for this he needed, in turn, a foothold in a theory of state sovereignty-which seemed to require that he descend to a theory of state
preexistence. But in the end it appears there was no sure footing in
any of this.
A.

The Myth of Sovereign Immunity and the Constitutional "Concept
of States"

Transparently, there is no textual argument for Alden. Alden is
about state courts, and the Eleventh Amendment speaks to federal
courts. 16 7 On the other hand, it is hardly news when the Eleventh
Amendment will not support the result in an Eleventh Amendment
case. The Eleventh Amendment has not been supporting results in
Eleventh Amendment cases for over a century. 168 All the same, the
departure from the text in Alden is so extreme, so unprecedented,
that it helps us to understand why justice Kennedy, in the end, did not
actually base Alden on the Eleventh Amendment. While Alden reads
like an Eleventh Amendment opinion, in the end Alden simply lets the
Eleventh Amendment go. The Court finds, instead, that the Constitution's concept of "states"169 reflects a natural-law principle of state sovereign immunity, well understood at the time of the Founding, 170 a
167 The text reads as a rule of construction vis-A-vis "[t]he Judicial power of the
United States," requiring that that judicial power "shall not be construed" to extend

to actions against a state by a citizen of another state. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
168 See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
169 See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 713 (citing cases, and citing U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2;
art. IV, §§ 2-4; art. V; amend. X).
170 There was some reasoning along these lines also in the recent Seminole 7Wbe of
F/ofida v. Forida,517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (holding Congress without commerce power
to enforce federal law against a state in federal court) (overruling Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
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principle confirmed by both the Tenth and the Eleventh Amendments. At first blush, the argument looks rather convincing. One habitually supposes that a state has sovereign immunity at common law.
But even if that is so, that immunity is a creature of state, not federal,
law.' 71 And it turns out that this antique immunity principle is less
certain than appears. Justice Souter, dissenting in Alden, finds that
the only sovereign immunity at the time of the Founding was in the
Crown. 172 Moreover, Justice Kennedy does not say how it is, if the
constitutional concept of a "state" imports a federal constitutional
privilege of sovereign immunity, and if that immunity was presumed
at the time of the Founding, that judges far closer in time to the
Founding than the Rehnquist Court-the judges that decided
Chisholm v. Georgia, for instance-did not see a constitutionally-required sovereign immunity where the Alden Court finds it. Even as
late in the day as Hans v. Louisiana, the first Justice Harlan, concurring separately, could state a belief that Chisholm wras sound when decided. 173 Nor doesJustice Kennedy explain-if state immunity is such
a deep-rooted constitutional understanding-how it is that, in the two
centuries since the Founding, no one has ever suspected that states
had a federal immunity in their own courts.
In a striking passage in Alden, Justice Kennedy argues that the
preExisting sovereign immunity of the states must have been understood in state as in federal courts, or the Ex parte Young officer suit
would not have been needed.' 7 4 But surely it would have been more
accurate to say that it was the lack of federal-question jurisdiction at
7
first,1 5 and the decision in Hans v. Louisiana later, not state sovereignty, that blocked federal claims against the states in federal courts,
as is shown by the occasional attempt to litigate Contracts Clause
171

Cf Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 426-27 (1979) (holding that there is no fed-

eral constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity in state courts).
172 Alden, 527 U.S. at 764 (SouterJ., dissenting) ("The American Colonies did not
enjoy sovereign immunity, that being a privilege understood in English la" to be reserved for the Crown alone; 'antecedent to the Declaration of Independence, none of
the colonies were, or pretended to be, sovereign states.'" (quoting I J. STony, Cot.
MEARIES ON THE CONsTrunON § 207, at 149 (5th ed. 1891))).
173 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Harlan, J., concurring).
The comments made upon the decision in Cisliolin v. Georgia do not meet
my approval. They are not necessary to the determination of the present
case. Besides, I am of opinion that the decision in that case was based upon
a sound interpretation of the Constitution as that instrument then us.
Id.
174 See Aden, 527 U.S. at 747 (quoting extensively from Gen. Oil Co. v. Crain, 209
U.S. 211 (1908)).
175 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
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claims against the states in diversity.' 7 6 As for state courts, in light of
the Supremacy Clause, it seems reasonably clear today if it has not
been in the past that in state courts state immunities must give way to
177
federal liabilities. That is the clear implication of Howlett v. Rose.
The thinking in Crain's Case,178 that state courts adjudicating federal
rights in equity may not deem an Ex parte Young officer suit to be one
against the state, suggests that a federal, rather than a state, definition
of immunity has long pertained when federal rights are pursued in
state court. Given the Contracts Clause, and considering the
Supremacy Clause, it appears that whatever sovereign immunity from
federal suit the states had at the time of the Articles of Confederation
was surrendered "under the plan of the Convention," just as John
179
Marshall said it was.
We will have more to say about the supposed immunity of the
states before the Founding as we proceed.
B.

Our New Antebellum Constitution

More urgently, there is the grand fact of the Civil War. We have
very different constitutional understandings now, after the Civil War,
than we had at the time of the Founding. At the Founding we "split
the atom of federalism;"' 8 0 but the Civil War transformed it. Recall
that, in Union Gas, Justice Brennan took hold of the chronological
principle of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer'8 ' and argued that, if state sovereign
immunity is natural law,' 8 2 preexisting the Constitution, then the
Commerce Clause, coming later in time, obviously trumps it."s :

Under the commerce power, then, Congress could abrogate state sovereign immunity, just as it can under the Fourteenth Amendment. 18

4

176 See supra note 36.
177 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
178 General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211, 225-27 (1908), which was decided tie
same day as Ex parte Young, held that the Young officer suit should not be deemed to
be a suit against the state when state courts adjudicate federal rights.
179 The Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 352 n.b (1821); see supra note
99 and accompanying text. This view gains some support from the unquestioned
power of the United States to sue a state. See, e.g., United States v. Mississippi, 380
U.S. 128 (1965); United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
180 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 838 (1995) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("Federalism was our Nation's own discovery. The Framers split tile
atom of sovereignty.").
181 427 U.S. 445 (1976); see supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text.
182 SeeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (quoting 1 W. BLACtsroNE, COm.
MENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 234-35 (1765)).
183 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 14-17 (1989).
184 Id. at 16-17; see supra notes 51-61 and accompanying text.
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Justice Kennedy's reply to this was that the federal principle of state
immunity conveniently survived the Constitutional Convention. ts 5 Yet
even if that is so, after Fitzpatrick it is not possible to say that state
immunity survived the Fourteenth Amendment. And since the Eleventh Amendment was a casualty of the Civil War to that extent, why is
it not dead as a constitutional principle for all purposes? The nation,
after all, won the Civil War. The states lost. And that is so no matter
what enumerated power of Congress is sought to be exercised. The
Court is mistaken if it believes that the constitutional consequences of
the Civil War can be cabined in the Civil War Amendments.
C. The Myth of the State as the True Sovereign
If the state had some primordial sovereign immunity, it must have
been in some sense sovereign, as the Alden Court sees. The Alden
Court therefore espouses a theory of state sovereignty at the time of
the Founding. But Alden's theory seems painfully at odds vith the
Constitution's own theory of sovereignty and the familiar Federalist
argument based on that theory. Alden's theory of sovereignty is markedly inattentive to a great legacy, the nationalizing Federalist narrative

bequeathed to us by the Founders and more directly by the Marshall
Court. ChiefJustice Marshall laid out the Federalists' theory of sovereignty in the most eloquent of his opinions, lcCulloch v. Maryland.18 6
When McCulloch was savaged in a series of newspaper attacks, 8 7 Marshall rose to its defense, something he did for no case before or after
McCulloch, publishing his series of essays by "A Friend of the Union"
and "A Friend of the Constitution."' s Marshall's view in McCulloch
185 See supra notes 68-72 and accompan)ing text.
186 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 315 (1819).
187 The chief author was Spencer Roane, whom Thomas Jefferson would almost
certainly have appointed to the ChiefJusticeship had not the previous presidentJohn
Adams, scooped him with the appointment ofJohn Marshall. See BER.xAn SUn, z,
A HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT 53 (1993) (referring to 10 THE WRITNGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 140 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1899)); see also Note, Judge Spencer
Roane of Virginia: ChampionofStates'Rights-FoeofJohn Marshall, 66 HARv. L Rzv. 1242,
1258 (1953) (repeating the story as supposition). But see M1u'o.%cARET E. HoRSxtu.,
SPEiCER ROANE: JUDICIAL ADVOCaTE OFJEFF RSONL'AN PRINCIPLES

33-34 (1986) (ex-

pressing a doubt about this history).
188 See GERALD GUNTHER, JOHN MARSHALL'S DEFENSE OF MCCL.OCWI V.11ELI D
(1969) (describing Professor Gunther's discovery of the authorship of Marshall's A
Friend of the Constitution" letters to the press). For a recent account of Marshall's
secret authorship, see Charles F. Hobson, Editing Marshall, 33J. XAnsLui u.L L RE%.

823, 847-48 (2000):
Another critical moment in the Court's history us the controversy over the
decision in McCuilodt v. Maiyland, which flared ith particular intensity in
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and in the essays was Alexander Hamilton's view, 189 and it was to become Abraham Lincoln's view as well. To Marshall, the sovereign was
hardly the states-it was "We the People."19 0 It was "We the People"
who ordained and established the Constitution, not "We the States."
Against this, concededly, there is the fact that the states "consented to" the Constitution, as that document itself closes by declaring. 19 1 This consent, however, is patently a two-edged sword. It might
signify retained sovereignty, but it might also signify, as Chief Justice
Marshall suggested in The Cohens,19 2 that the states had submitted
themselves in the plan of the Convention to federal supremacy-including potential liabilities on their future indebtedness"9 3 to private
parties for violations of federal law. The more serious counterargument, at first blush, is that the Constitution came into effect only after
it was ratified in nine states, as provided by Article VII. But ChiefJustice Marshall dealt a fatal blow to that argument as well. Ratification,
notably, was not by the state legislatures, but by conventions of "the
people" within each state. As Marshall put this in McCulloch:
Virginia during the spring and summer of 1819. So vehement were the
newspaper attacks on that opinion that Marshall himself was provoked to
reply with a series of essays, concealing his identity under the pseudonyms
"A Friend to the Union" and "A Friend of the Constitution." In [separate]
letters to Story and Washington, [Marshall] identified the Court's principal
antagonists-Virginia judges William Brockenbrough and Spencer Roaneand disclosed his own authorship of the "Friend" essays.... In 1969, Professor Gerald Gunther brought [this] to light.... This public defense of the
Supreme Court was an extraordinary, even risky, undertaking by the sitting
ChiefJustice, who took special care to keep his authorship secret. His unprecedented personal intervention was a measure of his deep alarm that the
attacks on McCulloch were the opening wedge of a meditated attack on the
Constitution and Union.
189 See SAMUEL J. KONEFSKY, JOHN MARSHALL AND ALEXANDER HAMILTON: ARu(i:t
TECrs OF THE AMERICAN CoNsTrITTION 165-91 (1964) (arguing that McCulloch's theories of sovereignty and union represent the greatest influence of Hamilton's thinking
on John Marshall).
190 For a concise intellectual history of the theory of popular sovereignty in the

colonial period,

see CLINTON ROSSITER, SEEDTIME OF THE REPUBLIC: TilE ORIGIN OF
THE AMERICAN TRADITION OF POLITICAL LIBERTY 143-47 (1953).

191

See U.S. CONST. art. VII.
Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of
America the Twelfth In Witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our
Names.
Id. (preceding the list of signatories) (emphasis added).
192 See supra notes 99-101 and accompanying text.
193 See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
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It is true, they [the People] assembled in their several states-and
where else should they have assembled? ... [W] hen they act, they
act in their states. But the measures they adopt do not, on that
account, cease to be the measures of the people
themselves, or be94
come the measures of the state governments.'
The state sovereignty theory at the heart of Alden is antithetical to
this illustrious tradition and, indeed, to the Constitution itself.
D.

States of Imagination: The Mythical Theory of the PrexistingState

The Alden Court's picture of states, sovereign states, that preexisted the nation-a picture that, admittedly, seems to be very widely
shared-is ahistorical. The colonies obviously could have had no exis-

tence as "sovereign" states until after their declared or de facto independence from the Crown. It is true that some of the colonies did
individually declare their independence. But every colony that did so
acted at the request of and in deference to the Continental Con-

gress. 195 Congress certainly preceded the states.
Moreover, the Union preceded both. As Abraham Lincoln
pointed out in his First Inaugural Address, "The Union is much older
than the Constitution."' 9 6 Although Lincoln understood that the
194 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 403 (1819).
195

See

SAMUNEL H. BEER,

To MAKE

A NATION: THE REDiscovERY OF A.%tEria(-

FED-

ERAusMi (1993), and especially pages 200-06 on "How the States Were Created." See
generally JACK N. RAKOvE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL PoLrcs: AN I-r--TnRETvE
HsroRY OF THE CoNTINElrAL CONGREss (1979). And see the useful collection of current essays in INVENTING CONGRESS: ORIGINS AND EsTABUSHNMENT OF THE FIRsr FWERD.
L%
CONGRESS (Kenneth R. Bowling & Donald R. Kennon eds., 1999).
196 Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in V CoN.:PLETEWORKS OF ABRAHAM LINcoLN 169, 174 (John G. Nicolay &John Hay eds., 1905).
The Union is much older than the Constitution. It was formed, in fact, by
the Articles of Association in 1774. It was matured and continued by the
Declaration of Independence in 1776. It was further matured, and the faith
of all the then thirteen States expressly plighted and engaged that it should
be perpetual, by the Articles of Confederation in 1778. And, finally, in 1787
one of the declared objects for ordaining and establishing the Constitution
was "to form a more perfect Union."
Id. Interestingly, a great Virginian,John Marshall, vividly testified, in his brief autobiographical memoir, to a fidelity to the Union that predated the Revolution and informed his boyhood:
I had grown up ata time when a love of union and resistance to tie claims of
Great Britain were the inseparable inmates of the same bosom;-when patriotism and a strong fellow feeling with our suffering fellow citizens of Boston
were identical;-when the maxim "united we stand, divided we fall" was the
maxim of every orthodox American; and I had imbibed these sentiments so
thoughroughly [sic] that they constituted a part of my being. I carried them
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Union formally came into being with the Declaration of Independence, he believed that the people of the colonies had been informally but indissolubly bound to each other in Union-Americans
alP 9 7 -even before the quarrel with England, back, back into the dim
past, as far back as the "mystic chords of memory" could sound or
bind. 198 We were already becoming a nation, epluribus unum, far back
with me into the army where I found myself associated with brave men from
different states who were risking life and everything valuable in a common
cause believed by all to be most precious; and where I was confirmed in the
habit of considering America as my country, and congress as my government. I partook largely of the sufferings and feelings of the army....
JOHN MARSHALL, AN AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKErCH 9-10 (John Stokes Adams ed., 1937).
197 The phenomena, for example, of the multi-colony Committees of Correspondence and the Sons of Liberty, in the period leading up to the Revolution and continuing into the revolutionary period, are strong evidence of this feeling. See, e.g., Letter
from Christopher Gadsen to Boston Committee of Correspondence (Charlestown,
S.C., June 28, 1774), in THE WRITINGS OF CHRISTOPHER GADSDEN 1746-1805, at 100,
100-01 (Richard Walsh ed., 1966):
At the Desire of the Gentlemen whose names you'll see in an Advertisement
in the inclosed paper who have been requested to receive the Donations
offer'd in this Colony for the Benefit of such Poor persons in Boston whose
unfortunate Circumstances occasion'd by the Operation of the Late Unconstitutional Act of the British Parliament may be thought to stand in need of
immediate Assistance, we have the Honour to send you the inclosed Bill of
Lading for 194 whole and 21 bbls. rice laden by us on board the Sloop Mary,
John Dove, Master for Salem there to be delivered to your order and disposed of in any manner that you may judge most conducible to the above
mention'd Intention of the Donors.... We beg leave to assure you that the
people of this Colony sincerely Sympathize in the most feeling Manner with
their Brethren at Boston and are well convinced that their Steadiness and
Spirit in the Common Cause of America has brought upon them that...
Vengence the effect of which they are now suffering.
See also id- at 66:
[T]he friends of liberty here are all as sensible as our brethren to the Northward, that nothing will save us but acting together. The Province that endeavours to act separately will certainly gain nothing by it; she must fall with
the rest, and not only so, but be deservedly branded besides with ever lasting
infamy.
Id. (quoting a Letter from Christopher Gadsen to William Samuel Johnson and
Charles Garth (Charleston, S.C., Dec. 2, 1765)).
198 See Lincoln, supra note 196, at 185:
Though passion may have strained, it must not break our bonds of affection.
The mystic chords of memory, stretching from every battle-field and patriot

grave to every living heart and hearthstone all over this broad land, will yet
swell the chorus of the Union when again touched, as surely they will be, by
the better angels of our nature.
These old shared recollections included shared struggles to dispossess the Indians, to
free ourselves from our new-world theocracies and bigotries, and to deal with the sell-

20o1]

OF SOVEREIGNTY

AND UNION

1153

in our colonial past. And when we fought the revolution, we fought it
together. Shortly after the close of the Civil War, Lincoln's First Inaugural Address found an echo in ChiefJustice Chase's opinion for the
Court in Texas v. Wite:199
The Union of the States never was a purely artificial and arbitrary
relation. It began among the Colonies, and grew out of common
origin, mutual sympathies, kindred principles, similar interests, and
geographical relations. It was confirmed and strengthened by the
and character, and
necessities of war, and received definite form,
2 00
sanction from the Articles of Confederation.
The states came into formal existence as states only when the nation came into formal existence, with Congress's adoption of the Declaration of Independence. States and nation were simultaneous
creations. At that point this country received its name, the United
States of America, and at that same point the constituent "states" of
the United States came into being, in Chief'Justice Chase's rather metaphysical formulation, as "states in Union."2 0 ' And it seems reasonably clear that the states, as states, from this beginning, were never
more than quasi-sovereign, continuing alwk-ays to hold themselves in
some sense in deference to Congress as they had from the moment
the First Continental Congress came together.
In this limited sense, as states in Union, it is true that the states
did have some existence before the Constitution of 1789, although it
was hardly an independent or sovereign existence. We see them at
first during the Revolution, failing to meet their requisitions for the
miserable provision of the Continental Army and later, under the Articles of Confederation, unable to govern themselves, falling into debt

and quarrels and civil disorder.20 2 It is certainly true that under Article II of the Articles of Confederation, the states purported to "retain"
their "sovereignty."20 3 But no such clause survived the Constitutional
Convention, notwithstanding Justice Kennedy's insistence in Alden
inflicted but intensifying problem of white and black slavery, North and South. See
generaly, e.g., SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY A .c ..EssAYS ON COLONIAL
supra note 190; V.F. CALET=oN,
Morton Smith ed., 1959); RossrrEi,

HisTov (Janes
THE Axv.%J.ENING

OF ArMERICc (1939).

199 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 724-25 (1868) (Chase, C.J.) (holding the Union perpetual and indissoluble; setting at naught the purported secession of Texas; ruling that

those creditors who dealt with the rebel state could take nothing).
200

Id

201 I& at 725.
202 For a comprehensive modem treatment of the period, see Rictmom B. Morws,
TE FoRGING OF THE UNION, 1781-1789 (1987).
203 ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. II. "Each State retains its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every power, jurisdiction and right, which is not by this

1154

NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW

[VOl,. 76' 4

that somehow a constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity
did. The Tenth Amendment reserves a residuum of "powers," not
"sovereignty," to the states. Sovereignty is an item for which the Con20 4
stitution finds a very different repository-in "the people."
As for the asserted sovereign immunity of these supposedly preexisting sovereign states, neither the Articles of Confederation nor the
Constitution makes the slightest reference to it. Justice Souter, dissenting in Alden, points out that, even in the period of the Articles of
Confederation, some states did not recognize sovereign immunity as a
defense even to common-law claims. Some even prohibited the de2 0 5 Yet of
fense in their own constitutions or waived it by legislation.
course some states during that period did recognize the common-law
defense of sovereign immunity. But the defense had its source in
state, not federal, law. What matters, however-although Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court does not seem to notice the difficulty-is
that it would not be possible to say with any confidence that those
early "immunity" states would have interposed the defense in afederal
case. There was very little federal law at the time of the Articles, and
there were no federal courts, save for a single court reviewing admiralty cases coming from the state courts. 20 6 And of course under the
Articles of Confederation there was no Contracts Clause, or any other
constitutional clause likely to ground a constitutional claim against a
state. So it is only for the sake of argument that we could assume that
those states recognizing the defense of sovereign immunity would
have applied it in a federal case.
True, the theory of the Articles of Confederation was that the
nation was a loose "confederation" of, or "compact" among, quasi-sovereign states. And even if Article II of the Articles of Confederation,
purporting to retain state sovereignty, was as tautological as the Tenth
Amendment is held to be,20 7 it still might be supposed that the main
Confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled." Id.
But the states already existed "in Union" at this time.

204 See supra notes 186-94 and accompanying text.
205 SeeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 769-70 (1999) (SouterJ., dissenting).
206 See HENRYJ. BOURGUIGNON, THE FiRST FEDERAL COURT: Tm FEDERAL An'EL.
LATE PRIZE COURT OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION, 1775-1787 (1977).
207 For Article II of the Articles of Confederation, see supranote 203. The character of the Tenth Amendment as a "truism" is laid down in United States v. Darl, 312
U.S. 100, 124 (1941), and reaffirmed, more or less, in New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 156-57 (1992). In New York, Justice O'Connor, for the Court, used some
sleight of hand with Darby, doing for the Tenth Amendment what the Court would
later do for the Eleventh:
The Tenth Amendment likewise restrains the power of Congress, but this
limit is not derived from the text of the Tenth Amendment itself, which, as
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part of sovereignty remained lodged in the states, and only the residuum was left to the weak nation. But it was the whole point of the
Constitution, as everybody knows, to correct the mistaken theory of
the Articles of Confederation. The very purpose of the Constitution
was to make it possible for the nation to govern effectively, notwvithstanding the powers and immunities of the states. The Constitution
has a Supremacy Clause. It has a Supreme Court. And Congress has
power to create federal courts and to regulate interstate commerce.
In ditching the Articles of Confederation for the Constitution, the
idea was to form "a more perfect Union," not "more sovereign states."
What sovereignty, at all events, could the states have retained
under the Articles, however impotent the nation, that would have survived the Constitution? The nation's powers could not have derived
from delegations of state sovereignty, as they do from the consent of
the People. No state, then or now, ever could have had any sovereign

power over the interstate commerce or the foreign relations of the
nation. Although a state then as now might rary on interstate commerce, the state never could have had any sovereign power over the
interstate commerce of the nation, and today can affect interstate
commerce only if presenting no obstacle to national policy. Although
a state, then as now, might carry on its own foreign relations, no state
20
then or now can carry on the foreign relations of the United States.
Then as now, no state can make a separate treaty.20 9 No state today
can enact foreign relations law in conflict with federal law.2 10 And by
analogous reasoning, any sovereign "immunity" "retained" by a state
at the Founding could be exercised today if, and only if, consistent
with national enforcement policy.
Nor were the powers delegated to the nation in the Constitution
delegated by the states, as is often said, but rather by "the
2 11
Constitution."
we have discussed, is essentially a tautology. Instead, the Tenth Amendment
confirms that the power of the Federal Government is subject to limits that
may, in a given instance, reserve power to the States.
Id.
208 See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 440-41 (1968) (precempting an Oregon statute regulating the extent to which a foreign national could inherit land in
Oregon, based on whether the foreigner's country would permit an American to
inherit).
209 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1; ARTiCLES OF CONFEDEMVnON art. VI.

210 See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (preempting Massachusetts' sanctions against Burma for human rights violations).
211 U.S. CoNsT. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to tie United States by die
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively,
or to the people.").
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To be sure, there are two sides to most stories, and the story we
have been retelling is only the Federalist side of the story. But I
should have thought the Antifederalist side of the story was, or ought
to have been, laid to rest with the brave, deluded Confederate dead.
E.

Calhoun's Ghost

So the Alden Court has given us dubious constitutional interpretation grounded on dubious theory. The Court's theory of state sovereignty seems an exercise in nostalgia for the good old days under the
Articles of Confederation-a theory that sounds more like John C.
Calhoun than the Founding Fathers. It was Calhoun, echoing the
Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions of 1798,212 who taught that the
states could "interpose" themselves between the people and federal
law, and who advanced a program for state "nullification" of federal
law 2 13-ideas that would be preached again by the diehard segregationists of the 1950s. It was Calhoun who offered the subversive and
spurious teaching that if such "interposition" and "nullification"

failed, each state, in its own constitutional convention, had a unilateral right to secede from the Union, without regard to the constitutional amendment process-an idea repudiated by Abraham Lincoln
in the First Inaugural Address.2 1 4 These doctrines, I should have
thought, have been as thoroughly discredited as any in our history.2 1t ,
212

See Thomas Jefferson, Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, reprinted in 4

JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON T-Lm ADOP
TION OF THE FEDERAL CONSrITUTION 540 (2d ed. 1907);James Madison, Virginia Reso-

lutions of 1798, reprintedin 4 id.
at 528. The story of the Resolutions is nicely told in H.
Jefferson Powell, The Principlesof '98: An Essay in HistoricalRetrieva4 80 VA. L. REv. 689
(1994). For resolutions opposing the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions, see WALTER

F. MuRPHY ET AL.,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION

264-65 (1986) (citing

the resolutions of Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont).
213 Under Calhoun's proposal, if three-fourths of states "nullified," this would be
tantamount to constitutional amendment, and federal law would be nullified everywhere. SeeJohn C. Calhoun, The South CarolinaExposition and Protest (1828) (report to
the South Carolina legislature), reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OFJOHN C. CALiIOUN 442
(Clyde N. Wilson & W. Edwin Hemphill eds., 1977). For additional background, see
Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1295, 1305 n.41 (1997).
214 See Lincoln, supranote 196, at 173 ("I hold that, in contemplation of universal
law and of the Constitution, the Union of these States is perpetual.... It is safe to
assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law for its own
termination.").
215 The ultimate settlement of the issue is to be read in the case of Texas v. Tifte,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 726, 735-36 (1868) (holding that Texas could not unilaterally
secede from the Union, and acts undertaken by Texas when in a state of rebellion
were nullities; therefore, Texas could invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court,
and was entitled to the proceeds of bonds negotiated for goods during the Civil War;
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The Myth of Retained Sovereignty: The Tenth Amendment and the
"Conditions" of Ratification

In Alden, casting about for some mooring in the constitutional
text,Justice Kennedy seemed to sense an insufficiency for the purpose
in "the constitutional concept of a state." So he grasped at the straw
of the Tenth Amendment. He found that his state sovereignty theory
was "confirmed" not only by the Eleventh Amendment, but also by the
Tenth.2 1 6 In fact he relied if anything more heavily on the Tenth. But
it is very hard to fall back on the Tenth Amendment to legitimize
Alden. In over two centuries of constitutional history, no one has ever
said or thought that the Tenth Amendment imports any notion of
2 17
state immunity from suil
And here the Court's historical discussion seems particularly unpersuasive. It is true that some state ratifications of the Constitution
purported to be conditioned on retention of state immunity. But that
was the fact for two states only, New York and Rhode Island.2 18 Recall
that, when returning their ratifications, a number of states recommended or prayed for various sorts of amendments to the Constitution. Then as now these tacked-on admonitions were read as merely
precatory. Very few of these earnest prayers for amendment made the
final cut.2 1 9 Madison culled twelve from nearly forty of the most frequently-made such requests, and only ten of these made it into the Bill
of Rights. State sovereign immunity was not among these. It is not in
the original Constitution of 1787, and it is not in the Bill of Rights. I
do not want to be terribly textualist about this, but, as Justice Scalia
might say about some cited conclusion in a House report, state sovereign immunity was not part of the final deal as reflected in the text.
That is probably one of the reasons a majority of the Supreme Court
decided against the state in Chisholm v. Georgia,2 20 why Chisholm was
and those creditors who traded with Texas during its period of rebellion could take
nothing). See also Hart v. White, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 646, 649-52 (1872) (holding that,
Georgia never having left the Union, her attempted secession in no v-ay excused her
from her obligations under the Impairment of Contracts Clause; not citing Texas v.
White,understandably, since the two opinions' ultimate conclusions as to state liability

were inconsistent).
216 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713 (1999).
217 See id. at 762-63 (Souter, J., dissenting).
218 See 1 Jo NArTAN ELIoT,DEB-TES ON TME FEDFAL COxSTTtrrloN 329 (1996)
(1836) (as to New York); id. at 336 (as to Rhode Island).
219 ForJames Madison's view that none of these requests could be read as conditioned on a right of withdrawal, see Letter from James Madison to Alexander Hamilton (July 20, 1788), reprinted in THE ORIGINS OF THE AtmRICaw Coxsm'wrnoN: A
DocumNTARY HISTORY 120 (Mfichael Kammen ed., 1986).

220 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
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probably right when it was decided, and why the first Justice Harlan
thought Chisholm was right when it was decided. 2 2 ' And that is among
the reasons why not only Alden, but also Hans v. Louisiana,was and
remains wrong.
One of the things the Framers did care about, as most of us understand the history today, was rescuing the public and private credit
of the country and protecting rights of property. These policies cannot be vindicated if the government is immune from suits fbr
money.22 2 No polity can enjoy public credit and at the same time in-

dulge the luxury of a government unanswerable to suit by its creditors.
Unlike the chimera of sovereign immunity, state liability is part and
parcel of the Constitution. The Contracts Clause 223 speaks directly to

the concern that debtor states pay their obligations, 2 24 as does Article
III, Section 2, authorizing federal jurisdiction over such suits. And the
Supremacy Clause contemplates enforcement of state obligations in
state as well as federal courts.
IV. THE MyrH OF THE SEAMLESS WEB
A.

The Myth of the Background Understandings

Alden, then, gives us a constitutionalized federal common law of
sovereign immunity which makes little theoretical or historical sense.
To make matters worse, federal common law on this occasion "moves"
with what Holmes would have called a "molar" rather than a "molecular" motion. 225 After Alden one feels a rather massive tectonic shift in
thejurisprudence. The case makes a deep and radical change, in considerable tension with prior law. 226 Justice Kennedy does a creditable

job of "reconciling" cases along hitherto unnoticed lines of opportu221 See supra note 173.
222 But see, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 662-63 (1974) (holding that
officer suits will not lie for court orders to release past moneys owed, because such
moneys are similar to damages from the state treasury); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443,
506-07 (1887) (holding that an officer suit cannot lie for money owed on the contract, since the state is the real party in interest, and the officer cannot pay).
223 U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
224 See, for the early understanding that the Clause embraced public contracts,
Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), and Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
225 See S. Pac. Co. v.Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 221 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("I
recognize without hesitation thatjudges do and must legislate, but they can do so only
interstitially; they are confined from molar to molecular motions.").
226 See, e.g., Pfander, OnceMore Unto the Breach, supranote 15, at 819 ("Alden repre.
sents a challenge to much of the existing learning in the field.").
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nity, but one is left with the sense that after Alden one's understandings must undergo substantial and complex transformations.
To begin with, there is Nevada v. Hal, 2 2 7 holding that there is no
constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity. That ivas a curious case in which California took jurisdiction over a private tort claim
against the state of Nevada. The Supreme Court, by Justice Stevens,
found nothing either in the Eleventh Amendment, or in general preExisting background understandings, that made state sovereign immu-

nity in a state court somehow a principle of constitutional law. But in
Alden, Justice Kennedy found it easy to distinguish these holdings. He

simply pointed out, quite correctly, that the forum in Nevada v.Hall
was the court of a sister state, not the defendant state's own court.
Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Nevada v. Hall,had repeatedly
drawn the distinction himself.22 8 Justice Kennedy was apparently unaware that this easy distinction undercuts Seminole Tibe and Hans v.
Louisiana. After the Court has relied on this argument, Alden's crucial
preexisting "understandings," which are confirmed by the Tenth
Amendment and graven in constitutional stone, cannot be used coherently to play the role of the Eleventh Amendment in federal courts,
because Alden is about a sovereign's immunity in its own. More fundamentally, nothing in the distinction between a state's own courts and
another state's courts gets at the refusal of the Court in Nevada v. Hall
to find any principle of state sovereign immunity at all-whether
within the Constitution, or underlying it. Nevada v. Hall specifcally
rejected the argument that constitutional principles underlying Eleventh Amendment immunity protect a state in a state court.2-9

227 440 U.S. 410 (1979).
228 SeeAlden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 738 (1999) (citing Hal4 440 U.S. at 414). It is
generally true that a sovereign is immune only to the extent the forum's law is willing
to recognize its immunity. For example, the immunity velnon of, say, France in American courts is determined not by French law, but by an act of Congress. See Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611 (1994).

229 SeeNevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 420-21 (1979) (specifically reffising to extend
Eleventh Amendment coverage to the states); id. at 418-19 (rejecting the argument
that there is some constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity); id. at 416--17
(noting the superior claim of the forum sovereign to determine ieimmunity of another sovereign, an idea which in the context of federal supremacy would seem to
translate to the principle of Howlett v. Rose see supra note 177, infra notes 234-35 and

accompanying text); id.
at 415 (rejecting the fiction that the King could do no
wrong); id. at 414 & n.5 (also finding no federal statutory immunity for the states).
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Castle in the Sky: Alden 's Mythical "ConstitutionalStructure"

To Alden's critics, Alden also seems to be in tension with a substantial body ofjurisprudence that forms a keystone in the structure of
the constitutional law of courts. Although Alden's critics are right
about this, they are wrong about an important piece of the puzzle, the
Supremacy Clause. The Supremacy Clause is an essential element in
the constitutional design, but it is the one such element with which
Alden can be reconciled. This has not been widely understood. Alden's double-barreled attack on substantive federal law enforcement

and on the power of Congress to make substantive federal law enforceable have perhaps obscured the picture. A due positivism ought
to alert us to the fact that Alden's new constitututional privilege is federal, not state, law. There is no offense to the Supremacy Clause when
a federal defense frustrates a federal claim.
The sense of dislocation an educated lawyer has in reading Alden
is nevertheless very real. Alden cannot readily be reconciled with the
old structural understandings of which the supremacy of substantive
federal law is a key feature. Alden blasts a hole in this structure, the
size of which can be measured not by the obvious damage to national
policy-that is a separate problem-but from the absence in that theoretical structure now of a theoretical state forum for federal statutory
claims against a state.
One sees these understandings in the Madisonian compromise of
1787-the feature of Article III that establishes not the inferior federal courts, but only Congress's power to establish them,230 thus impliedly requiring the preexisting state courts to be open for the
protection of federal rights. One sees them in the adjudicatory structure laid out under Article III by Justice Story in Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee2 31 and by ChiefJustice Marshall in The Cohens. This is the struc230 But see Michael G.Collins, Article III Cases, State CourtDuties, and the Madisonian
Compromise, 1995 Wis. L.REV. 39, 43 (1995) (arguing that at the time of the Founding
the structural implications of the Supremacy Clause and the Madisonian compromise
were not widely perceived and that many in that generation thought federal courts
necessary precisely because they did not believe state courts could take jurisdiction
over cases arising under federal law). At all events by the time of Martin v,Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), the true position was sufficiently clear tojoseph
Story, as it remained in his COMMENTARIES ON THE CONs-rITUtION OF THE UNIuID
STATES 589-90 (1833). (I should explain, for the generalist reader, that "the Madisonian compromise" is a modem reference to the failure of the Constitution to establish the inferior federal courts, coupled with the grant to Congress of power to do so.
The term seems to have been coined by Professor Redish. See Martin H. Redish &
Curtis E. Woods, CongressionalPower to Control the Jurisdictionof Lower Federal Courts: A
CriticalReview and a New Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 54 (1975)).
231 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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ture described in well-known language in Clafhn v. Houseman:23- "The
laws of the United States are laws in the several States, and just as
much binding on the ... courts thereof as the State laws ....The two
together form one system ofjurisprudence, which constitutes the law
of the land for the State ....

23 3
1

It is this structure, this grand constitutional design, this single System of jurisprudence, that is in tension with Alden. The most recent
important manifestation of the old understandings is the case of Howlett v. Rose.23 4 In Howlett, in a full-dress opinion by Justice Stevens, the

Court held, under the Supremacy Clause, that a state could not cloak
a school board with sovereign immunity in an action in the state's own
courts to enforce the federal Civil Rights Act of 1871.2 Think of it:
state immunity in state court trumped by federal supremacy and federal law. Although Alden is not about civil rights, Howlett seems to
inhabit a world that could not have Alden in it, and it is Howlett that
fits the predxisting structural understandings, not Alden. It is true
that, in Howlett, immunity is a matter of state law and, under Alden,
can also be a matter of federal law. But the principle of federal
supremacy destroyed the immunity defense in Howlett. It cannot do
that after Alden.
In Alden, Justice Kennedy purported to make short shrift of Hozelett. Neglecting for the moment the fact that Alden was a federal, not a
state, privilege, he pitched on another argument. The defendant in
Howlett, he quite rightly pointed out, was only a school board, a creature of the county, not the state.2 3 6 Such a defendant would be open
to suit in federal court as well.23 7 But why should that make a difference, if the sovereign state in its own courts under its own law could
define school boards as arms of the state rather than the county and
thus save school boards' the trouble of complying with federal law?
The weakness of the Court's distinction is revealed in the way courts
below are reading Alden and Seminole Tribe. Given the Court's radical
new thinking on the whole question, lower federal courts are indeed

232 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
233 Id.at 136-37.
234 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
235 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
236 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999).
237 See id.; see also Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274,
280-81 (1977) (holding counties and lesser subdivisions of the state not entitled to
Eleventh Amendment immunity).
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applying the immunity of the state to counties and, yes, to school
boards.

238

The true and important distinction between Howlett and Alden
derives from the fact that the immunity in Alden has its source in federal, not state, law. I do not mean to point up the obvious consequence that because Alden immunity is a constitutional privilege,
Congress cannot destroy it. Rather, I want to stress a great moral we
can take from this distinction: that, after all, Howlett, in theory, in principle, does survive Alden. Not for the trivial reason that in Howlett the
defendant was a county, but because of the principle of Howlett that is
worth preserving in the long run: that state-law defenses to federal
law, even the state-law defense of sovereign immunity, must fall, under
the Supremacy Clause.
Howlett follows from the classic case of Testa v. Katt.2 39 Testa in-

volved a federal statutory claim and in that way more closely resembled Alden. Testa stands for the proposition that, under the
Supremacy Clause, a state must adjudicate a federal claim, at least if it
adjudicates similar state claims. A state may not discriminate against a
litigant solely on the ground that she relies on federal law.240 Yet Alden authorizes the state, as a matter of federal law, in the teeth of this
settled understanding, to close its doors to a federal claim against the
state and even to discriminate against the litigant relying on such a
claim. In Alden itself, Maine was discriminating against a federal claim
in precisely the manner forbidden by Testa. Justice Kennedy acknowledged that Maine courts would sometimes take cognizance of an action for wages against the state, under Maine's own common law, but
not under federal statutory law.2 41 Justice Kennedy shrugged off such

choices as incidental to state sovereignty.2 42 He might have argued,
further, that to force a state to adjudicate a federal case against itself,
in order to avoid discrimination between claimants having similar
state and federal claims, would be to hold that a state's having law
similar to federal law could produce a "constructive waiver" of its soy238 For a useful review of recent cases in the lower courts, see Ronald D. Wenkart,
The Eleventh Amendment, Sovereign Immunity and Its Impact on School Districs, 147 WisT's
EDUC. L. REP. 15 (2000).

239 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
240 See, e.g., F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 775-76 n.1 (1982) (O'ConnorJ.,
concurring & dissenting); Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. Co. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1, 3-4
(1950); McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 230, 233-34 (1934); Douglas v.
N.Y., New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377, 387 (1929); Mondou v. N.Y., New
Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 58 (1912); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130,
136-37 (1876).
241 Alden, 527 U.S. at 758.
242

Id.
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ereign immunity-a concept that the Court had rejected in the same
term, in the College Savings Bank case.2 43 Yet that reflection may more
easily suggest to the reader that the doctrine of constructive waiver is
sound, than that discriminatory state door-closing rules are acceptable
simply because the state is the party defendant and the claim is under
federal law.
Alden undermines another central feature of the dual-court structure. Alden has the bizarre but serious consequence of creating a new
kind of door-closing rule, the novelty of which is that the inadequacy
of one set of courts will not trigger compensatory concurrent jurisdiction in the other, butjust the opposite-surely an unfamiliar configuration in our law. One thinks of the bodies of statute and case law, too
multifarious to be set out in anything more concise than a casebook
on federal courts, that condition denials of federal jurisdiction or abstentions from the exercise of federal jurisdiction on the adequacy of
the alternative state forum.2 4 In Alden, of course, the doors to all
courts are closed simultaneously. There is no alternative forum.
To be sure, the Court in the past has on at least one other occasion reached a blanket ouster ofjurisdiction, state and federal, with as
little attention to textual authorization as we see in Aklen. I refer to
the Court's iron enforcement of the Federal Arbitration Act. '- 7 Today, under that statute, an "agreement" of the parties to arbitrate,
however unbargained-for, 4 6 must be strictly enforced in state as in
federal courts, 247 although the Act pertains only to federal courts. If
the analogy is incomplete, it is only because in some sense the "con243 See Coll. Say. Bank x%Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S.
666, 680 (1999) (overruling Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964), with respect
to its doctrine of constructive waiver).
244 Consider, for example, the Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(1994), forbidding injunctions against a state tax where "a plain, speedy and efficient
remedy may be had in the courts of such State." See also, for example, theJohnson
Act of 1934, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (1994), forbidding injunctions against a state agency
when, inter alia, "a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of
such State."
245 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1994).
246 See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson'Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 33-35 (1991)
(holding in a Title VII case that the plaintiff alleging discrimination in employment
was bound by an arbitration dase in the rules of the New York Stock Exchange,
which rules were incorporated only by reference in boilerplate in the employment
contract). More recently, see Circuit City Stores, Inc. %.Adams, 121 S.Ct. 1302,
1308-11 (2001), in an employment discrimination action, narrowly construing the
Act's exclusion of employment contracts as limited to transportation workers.
247 See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-17 (1984) (holding that the
Federal Arbitration Act, though intended to govern only in federal courts, is binding
in all courts for all contracts in interstate commerce).
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sent" of the parties, at least, however fictitious, legitimizes these ousters-an advantage that the Alden plaintiffs did not enjoy. And of
course there is the further distinction that arbitration just might result
24
in a full recovery. s
It is ironic, in view of the magnitude of Alden's departure from
settled structural understandings, that in Alden Justice Kennedy had
the temerity to say (twelve times, by my count) that the Court based its
decision not only on constitutional history, but on the constitutional
"structure."249 We have yet to complete our examination of Alden's
version of constitutional history.2 50 But despite the twelve repetitions
about "structure," the Court had no convincing way of linking Alden to
the relevant structural features of the Constitution. The Court's only
sound structural point was that the Constitution recognizes the existence of the states as well as the nation. But to read immunity into
that fact is hardly more convincing than to read liability into it. When
Congress imposes liabilities upon the states, we understood, and Howlett v. Rose confirmed, that state sovereign immunity would be swept
away in state court by operation of the Supremacy Clause. We reasoned this way, in part, because, under Hans v. Louisiana, the same
result would not necessarily follow in federal court. As we have seen,
one of the reasons Alden had to fashion a federal privilege is, precisely,
that the Supremacy Clause defeats the actual preexisting immunity of
a state in its own courts-its immunity under its own law. 2 51

The structural understandings I have been describing were profoundly internalized before Alden, even among the Court's most conservative members. Let me reproduce here a recent statement of
these understandings by none other than Justice Clarence Thomas:
Nor can a desire for "intrastate uniformity" permit state courts to
refuse to award relief merely because a federal court could not
grant such relief. As petitioners note, it was not until 1875 that Congress provided any kind of general federal-question jurisdiction to
248 Blanket ouster seems too blunt an instrument to protect state dignity and autonomy. The state's credit depends on its conformity to law, and it should be an
advantage to the state to try its liabilities in its own courts. SeeJackson, Seductions of
Coherence, supra note 15, at 700; Shapiro, The 1999 Trilogy, supra note 15, at 754; Marshall, UnderstandingAlden, supra note 15, at 809.
249 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713, 724, 733, 728, 733, 741, 748, 752, 754, 758,
759, 760 (1999).
250 See infra notes 267-75 and accompanying text.
251 Contrary to these structural understandings, the Alden Court adopted the
spurious argument from symmetry advanced in the court below. "If Congress cannot
force the states to defend in federal court against claims by private individuals, it
similarly cannot force the states to defend in their own courts against these same
claims." Alden v. State, 715 A.2d 172, 174 (Me. 1998).
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the lower federal courts.... Because of the Supremacy Clause, state
courts could not have refused to hear cases arising under federal
between state and federal courts
law merely to ensure "uniformity"
25 2
located within a particular state.
To all of this entrenched wisdom, Justice Kennedy in Alden offered up the reply made available to him by his convenient federalization of the defense. Federal substantive law no longer has the
advantage over state immunity that the Supremacy Clause once provided. After Alden, an act of Congress imposing liability upon an un*consenting state, as upon other market participants, comes ith a

built-in discount: 'WVhen a State asserts its immunity to suit, the question is not the primacy of federal law but the implementation of the
law in a manner consistent with the constitutional sovereignty of the
States."1 3 The operative words here are "constitutional sovereignty."
Justice Kennedy is playing trumps.
Yet a position that removes a class of claims from the jurisdiction
of all courts, like a belled cat, sounds its own wvarning. It must depend, for due process, upon the existence of alternative viable imys in
which those claims can be heard. That is a problem to which I will
return shortly.
C.

The Anti-Commzndeering Embarrassment

The Alden Court suggested that in opening states to liability in
their own courts, Congress unconstitutionally attempted to "commandeer" the state courts, in violation of the anti-commandeering principle of Printz v. United States2 5 4 and of New York v. United States.255
A power to press a State's own courts into federal service to coerce
the other branches of the State, furthermore, is the power first to
turn the State against itself and ultimately to commandeer the entire political machinery of the State against its will and at the behest
2 6
of individuals.
What moved Justice Kennedy to attempt to sweep state courts
under the Tenth Amendment's proscription of "commandeering" was
his vision of a state judge hiacked by some disgruntled individual and
hamstrung by the imperatives of federal law, forced in the state's own
252 Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 588-89
(1995) (ThomasJ.).
253 Alden, 527 U.S. at 732.
254 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
255 505 U.S. 144 (1992); see also Prigg v. Pennsy)hania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 622
(1842); see supra note 3.
256 Alden, 527 U.S. at 749 (Kennedy, J.).
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courts to impose a governance upon the state antithetical to the
state's own views. This fear of a collapse of state autonomy also lay at
the heart of the firstJustice Harlan's dissent in Exparte Young257 If Ex

parte Young became established law, Justice Harlan warned, it
would work a radical change in our governmental system. It would
inaugurate a new era in the American judicial system and in the
relations of the National and state governments. It would enable
the subordinate Federal courts to supervise and control the official
action of the States as if they were "dependencies" or provinces. It
would place the States of the Union in a condition of inferiority
never dreamed of when the Constitution was adopted or when the
Eleventh8 Amendment was made a part of the Supreme Law of the
25
Land.
And yet Justice Harlan's warning was rejected and unheeded,
The litigation he feared then is what we think of today, in the typical
case, as civil rights litigation. It is enforcement of the Constitution
against a state, envisioned as early as the Contracts Clause, and insisted upon in the Fourteenth Amendment's "No state shall," enforcement we rightly expect in state courts as in federal. Without such
enforcement against state as well as local officials our nation might
still be scarred by statutory apartheid. Nor can there be any important
distinction, given the Supremacy Clause, between the "commandeering" of state courts in constitutional injunction cases under Brown
v. Board of Education and in statutory cases even for monetary relief
like Alden v. Maine. It is not much better for the nation to be scarred
by state exploitation of labor than by state racial discrimination.
Concededly, much in the anti-commandeering idea, even in this
context, commends it. A nation imposing liability upon a state in the
state's own courts may escape blame and shift costs. In the New York
case, the "blame" part of this argument interested Justice O'Connor.
She fretted that when the nation conscripts the states into its service,
lines of political accountability can become blurred.2 5 9 But that concern has doubtful salience in the context of the power of Congress
over state courts

60

That is because, to begin with, the Constitution

itself establishes the state courts' obligation under the Supremacy
Clause to enforce applicable federal law.2 6 ' The Constitutional com257
258
259
260
note

209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

Id. at 175.
See New York, 505 U.S. at 177.
See, for a policy analysis on this point, Marshall & Cowart, State Inmuniy, supra
15, at 1089.
261 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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mand is specifically binding upon state judges,262 on their oath,2',3
without regard to any possible confusion about political accountabil-

ity-or of shifted costs, for that matter. No doubt a state judge might
fail of reelection for following federal law. If so, that is a reason to
advocate an independent appointed state judiciary, not a reason to
advocate the fiustration of federal policies. For these sorts of reasons,
the Court in New York carefully excluded state courts from its anti2
commandeering principle. 64
But, quoting copiously from New York, Justice Kennedy in Alden
further muddied the waters: "The Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Congress the power to regulate individuals, not
States." 265 But there could be no issue of regulation of the state qua
state in Alden or in any analogous Article I case. In these cases, the

states are not singled out for regulation in their sovereign capacities,
but rather treated indistinguishably from all other participants in the
national markets. Maine here was regulated under the Fair Labor
236
Standards Act only as an employer, not as a state. '
V.

OUR ANTiFEDERALIST FOUNDERS

I am hardly the only writer who has paused to warn the reader
about the misuse of authority from the Founding by the Alden

Court.2 67 Alexander Hamilton, the staunchest of Federalists, and one
of the greatest political theorists the world has ever known, is taken by
262

1d.:

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and

theJudges in every State shall be bound therd any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
(emphasis added).

263 U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 3: "(J]udicial Officers, both of the United States and of
the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution..." (including, of course, Art. VI, ci. 2).
264 New York, 505 U.S. at 178-79.
265 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999) (quoting New York 505 U.S. at 166).
266 Justice Blackmun's argument in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan TransitAuthority, 469 U.S. 528, 545-47 (1985), that judges cannot draw these sorts of distinctions does not temper the force of this obseration, since Blackmun employed the
argument to justify blanket state liability, not immunity.
267 See &g., Nowak, The Gang ofFiv4 supra note 11, at 1099;James G. Wlson, The
Eleventh Amendment Cases: Going "Too Far"with JudicialNeofederalisn, 33 Loi. LA. L
REv. 1687, 1704-05 (2000).
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the Alden Court 268 as yielding the ground of state immunity from suit

and even urging the proposition. Hamilton is quoted as writing:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every
State in the Union. Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention, it Will remain with the
States and the danger intimated must be merely ideal.... [T]here
is no color to pretend that the State governments would, by the
adoption of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their
own debts in their own way, free from every constraint but that
269
which flows from the obligations of good faith.

Justice Kennedy in Alden does not scruple to make use even of
John Marshall, that nationalist intellectual giant. John Marshall appears in Alden as a states' rights enthusiast. We return with Justice
Kennedy to the Virginia ratifying convention, where it has fallen to
young John Marshall to defend Article III from attacks by Patrick
Henry and George Mason:
With respect to disputes between a state and the citizens of another
state, [federal] jurisdiction has been decried with unusual vehemence. I hope no gentleman will think that a state will be called at
the bar of the federal court. Is there no such case at present? Are
there not many cases in which the legislature of Virginia is a party,
and yet the state is not sued? It is not rational to suppose that the
sovereign power should be dragged before a court. The intent is, to
enable states to recover claims of individuals residing in other states.
I contend this construction is warranted by the words. But, say they,
there will be partiality in it if a state cannot be defendant. ...

It is

necessary to be so, and cannot be avoided. I see a difficulty in mak-

2 70
ing a state defendant, which does not prevent its being plaintiff.

The reader should understand that what the Alden Court is supplying here is law-office history. These are quotations selectively
culled from contexts in which the revered speakers were making salesmanly assurances about the federal diversity jurisdiction, in ordinary
state-law actions on contracts. But what of the possibility of claims under
268 See Alden, 527 U.S. at 716-17.
269 Id. (quoting THE FEDERALsIT No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)). See generally JoSEPH M. LyNcH, NEGOTIATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE EARLIEST DEBATES OVER ORIGI-

INTENT (1999) (arguing, inter alia, that Alexander Hamilton, for example, did
not rely upon the arguments he had made in The FederalistPaperswhen, for example,
writing his celebrated Report on the Bank of the United States).
270 3 ELLIOT, supra note 218, at 555-56.
NAL
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federallaw? John Marshall made quite clear the Federalist view on that
very different question when, as ChiefJustice, he explained that nothing in the Eleventh Amendment or in state sovereign immunity generally could prevent the enforcement of federal law. That was in the
case of Osborn v. Bank of the United States.27 t "[E]ven if the State be a
party, that circumstance would not oust the jurisdiction of the Court,
in a case arising under the constitution and laws of the Union. There
the nature of the controversy, and not the character of the parties,
must determine the question of jurisdiction." 27 - In an action to enforce federal law, then, we know that John Marshall would have deferred not one whit to the Eleventh Amendment or to any other
version of state immunity. And this is what Alexander Hamilton, from
whom ChiefJustice Marshall derived much of his thinking, meant in
The FederalistNo. 81, when he said that a state was immune, unless it
surrendered its immunity in the plan of the Convention.27 3 So it appears
that the Alden Court's supposed authorities need not influence us.
To be fair to Justice Kennedy, in Alden he is only following the
74
law-office history provided by Justice Bradley in Hans v. Louisiana,much of which was picked up in the same way in cases like Principality
27 5
of Monaco v. Mississippi VI.

THE MyrH OF ALDEN'S INCONSEQUENCE

Some commentators have taken the position that Alden does not
matter, or does not matter very much.2 7 6 When the subject is federal271
272
273
1961).
274
275
276

22 U.S. (9 Wheat-) 738 (1824) (Marshall, CJ.).
Id. at 798.
See THE FDERAUSr No. 81, at 549 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
See 134 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1890).
See 292 U.S. 313, 323-26 (1934) (Hughes, C.J.).
For one of the more adroit presentations of this view, see Michael C. Dorf, No

FederalistsHere: Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the Rehnquist Court, 31 RLrrcGEs J.
741 (2000). An important part of this argument is an attack on the "process" theory
of the Garciacase, the argument that because the states are represented in Congress,
judicial review of legislation in the name of federalism is not needed. Id. at 747-50;
see also Marshall, UnderstandingAlden, supra note 15, at 820 ("Process federalism, as
envisioned in Garcia, however, has failed."). The controversy over "process" theory
and states' rights is an interesting one, but there is a short answer to the whole quesnot national
tion. In the context of Alden and FloridaPrepaid,what ias at stake %%-a.s
power over essentially local concerns, but unquestioned national pov-er that had been
extended over the states, not only to give evenhanded and more uniform effect to
national policy, but to do so on behalf of previously neglected individual rights. If
only for this reason, it is hard to make an outright argument that Alden was positively
a good thing. But see, eg., Wells, Suing Statesfor Money, supra note 15, at 800 (arguing
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ism, or some other airy abstraction, for all I know they may be right.
When the subject is the rights of individuals, I would respectfully suggest that a constitutional democracy cannot afford to be disregardful.
If in your mind structural principles, in the abstract, trump individual
rights, we must agree to disagree; but there is a very good argument
that American courts sit to remedy violations of the rights of individuals-and of states as well, when they act as individuals and are treated
unjustly. The one thing an American court ought not to do, I should
have thought, is to protect a lawless government at the suit of an individual whom that government has wilfully injured.
A.

A Little Problem of Due Process

In Marbuy v. Madison, ChiefJustice Marshall drew from the wellsprings of the con'imon law, when, following Blackstone, he insisted
that wherever there is a legal right, there is a remedy; that the government may not "sport away the vested rights of others;" 277 that to leave
government wrongdoing unremedied would be to cause our nation to
lose the name of a government of laws and to invite the opprobrium

.ofother nations. 278 Whatever the shape of, or reasonable limitations
on, constitutional remedies may be, our modem constitutional understandings spring from that same great tradition, and we tend to feel
that denials ofjudicial relief from government invasions of individual
right must raise questions of due process. Alden raises acute issues of
due process because Alden is about more than state courts, just as it is
about more than the Fair Labor Standards Act. The Alden/Seminole/
Hans padlock closes all courts to very nearly all federal statutory claims
against a state-the denial is both trans-jurisdictional and transsubstantive.
Under this new dispensation there is no inquiry, in the past so
much a part of other door-closing doctrines, into the question
whether an adequate state forum is available when the federal door is
to be closed, or an adequate federal forum is available when the state
door is to be closed. This omission may, by itself, constitute one of the
most stunning changes in interjurisdictional doctrine in our time.
One of Alden's earlier companion cases, FloridaPrepaid Postsecondary
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank,2 79 preserving an inthat Alden is a "positive development" because it "reaffirmed" the due process principle of Reich v. Collins).
277 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166 (1803).
278 Id. at 163.

279 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
630 (1999) (holding the patent laws unenforceable as against a state); see alo Coil.
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fringing state from patent liability in federal court, was almost as unnerving as Alden itself, simply because federal jurisdiction in patent
infringement cases happens to be exclusive. Alden tightens the screws
on this coffin; after Alden it would seem that Congress cannot fix the
due process problem by allocating to the state courts a concurrent
jurisdiction over intellectual property cases. These cases, then, are an
invitation to the states to "sport away the vested rights" of individuals 2 8 0-a

28
license to steal.

1

I am put in mind of a very different case in the nineteenth century, the grand old case of United States v. Lee 282 There, the federal
authorities had seized Arlington, the late seat of the Lee family, osten-

sibly for failure to pay taxes in the right amount, although Lee's
widow had tendered payment in full. 2 83 At the suggestion that the
United States was immune from liability for this wrongful taking, the
Court, by Justice Miller, ringingly refused to let the government get
away with it.
All the officers of the government, from the highest to the lowest,
are creatures of the law, and are bound to obey it.
Courts of justice are established, not only to decide upon the
controverted rights of the citizens as against each other, but also
upon rights in controversy between them and the government
284

Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999)
(holding the trademark laws unenforceable as against a state).
280 Marbuy, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 166.
281 In Fair Labor Standards Act cases, we see this authorized taking of people's
money very clearly. Ironically, in some of these cases the Supreme Court is forcing
the immunity upon state courts that rejected it. See, e.g., Ark. Dept. of Educ. v.Jacoby,
144 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1999) (vacating and remanding, 962 S.W.2d 773 for reconsideration in light of Alden); see also Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Whittington, 144 L Ed. 2d 790
(1999) (same).
282 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
283 Id. at 197.
284 Id. at 220-21 (Miller, J.):
No man in this country is so high that he is above the law. No officer of the
law may set that law at defiance with impunity....
Shall it be said... that the courts cannot give a remedy when the citizen
has been deprived of his property by force, his estate seized and converted to

the use of the government without lawful authority, %ithoutprocess of law,
and without compensation, because the President has ordered it and his officers are in possession?
If such be the law of this country, it sanctions a tyranny which has no
existence in the monarchies of Europe, nor in any other government which
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In a talk I gave at a faculty colloquium on Alden at the University
of Texas, 28 5 I posed the rhetorical question, "Can the states just take
the money?" My esteemed colleague and co-panelist, Doug Laycock,
responded that it was the very purpose of sovereign immunity to permit a state to "take the money." He went so far as to say that to him
Alden was an unsurprising development. But surely, whatever the purpose of sovereign immunity, until Alden the Constitution would have
protected us from state deprivations of property without due process
of law.
Mindful of this, the Alden Court purported to leave in place a

number of alternative remedies. Justice Kennedy confidently assured
us that a traditional officer suit is still available, 286 citing Ex parte
Young. But that is not true. An officer suit cannot succeed in an action against the state for back wages. Under the doctrine of Edelman
v. Jordan,287 Ex parte Young is unavailable in claims for retrospective
relief.288 Back wages would be foreclosed. Justice Kennedy pointed
out that an officer may be sued for damages in her individual capacity.289 But no one on a government salary could pay the state's debt to
an entire class of workers. Only if the state indemnifies the officer
would this remedy work. But possible indemnification by the state is
an option over which a court could exercise no control. And what is
the likelihood that a state, standing on its immunity in order to deprive a class of workers of wages due them, would suddenly change its
mind and pay, after all? It does not go too far, then, to say that, without the private cause of action Congress provided in the Fair Labor
Standards Act, state employees have no realistic recourse. This analysis holds good across a spectrum of possible state actions stripping
individuals of the protections of federal law. Alden has not only
handed the states a license to steal, but, more generally, an authoriza29 0
tion to put at risk.
When we are talking about a license to steal, the constitutional
proscription against "takings," and related theories, might seem to ofhas a just claim to well-regulated liberty and the protection of personal
rights.
285 Faculty colloquium on "Federalism and the Eleventh Amendment," held at the
University of Texas School of Law, Sept. 3, 1999.
286 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756-57 (1999).
287 See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
288 This point is also noted by Professor Meltzer. See Meltzer, State Sovereign inmunity, supra note 15, at 1016.
289 Alden, 527 U.S. at 757.
290 For pre-Alden discussion, see John F. Duffy, Sovereign hnImunity, the Officer Suit
Fiction, and Entitlement Benefits, 56 U. CGt. L. REv. 295 (1989).

2001]

OF SOVEREIGNTY AND

UNION

1173

fer some control. But due process under Rehnquist Court cases will
mean-at most-that the state must furnish some remedy under its
own, not federal, law, 291 as long as the state furnishes some "meaning-

ful backward-looking relief." 292 If that is the position, Alden has the
net effect, at best, of confiding the plaintiff to her remedies under
state law, perhaps inferior state law, whenever she seeks relief in a
money case against the state. If the plaintiff's case is a matter of copyright, with scant exceptions she cannot look to state law for relief.
The federal copyright law explicitly preempts state law the moment a
copyrightable work is fixed in tangible form. 3a So FloridaPrepaidhas
left the copyright plaintiff with doubtful access to any "meaningful,
backward-looking relief." Can this be due process? If we confine our
inquiry to some other sort of intellectual property case, as to which
the field is held not to be completely preempted, the picture is not
much brighter. Suppose, in the FloridaPrepaidsort of case, that the
state is infringing an individual's patent or other intellectual property
rights. F/oridaPrepaidseals off the federal court. The plaintiff comes
to state court and, of necessity, pleads the state common law of unfair
competition. Notwithstanding Alden, the plaintiff survives a motion to
dismiss, relying on the Due Process Clause. But under state la,, the
customary federal remedies for misappropriation of intellectual property are unavailable. Statutory damages, regurgitation of profits, destruction of infringing articles, attorney's fees-any of those modes of
redress can disappear. In other words, the plaintiff will have only the
process that is due under state law, not complete relief, certainly not
the relief Congress provided. In such a case the state is not, as the
Alden Court said, still "subject" to federal law; and the costs will fall on
the very class that federal law was intended to protect. Meanwhile, the
state will retain benefits of its misappropriation. What sort of incentive is this?
Alden also can lead to novel varieties of strategic thinking. Compare the following two hypotheticals. Suppose, in the Alden situation,

that Maine withholds from its employees the disputed "half" in "timeand-a-half." Federal law cannot be enforced. Under Maine law, there

may well be an action for wages wrongly witlheld, and tie plaintiffs
might seek to collect the lost "half." But Maine may plead sovereign
291 Nat'l Private Truck Council, Inc. v. Okla. Tax Comm'n, 515 U.S. 582, 592
(1995) (holding that a state-law remedy in lieu of an action under § 1983 would be
permissible in state court in the special circumstances of a suit to challenge an unconstitutional state tax).
292 McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18. 31
(1990); see also Nat'l Private Truck Couiwil 515 U.S. at 588-92.
293 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (1994).
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immunity under Maine law, as we know from Alden that Maine is likely
to do. At this point, due process as well as the Supremacy Clause presumably pry open the state court's doors, forcing the state to give
"meaningful backward-looking relief."294 The workers collect the
wages due them under federal law.
But now compare with that the following situation. Suppose that

Maine withholds all these employees' overtime pay. Maine's own
common-law action for wages would clearly be held to be "meaningful, backward-looking relief."295 Yet Maine's remedy, unlike the Fair
Labor Standards Act, does not provide for time-and-a-half for overtime, but only for "time." In such a case, the state is not, as the Alden
Court said, still "subject" to federal law, but only to state law, and the
costs will be borne by the very class the federal legislation was intended to protect.2 96 And with this possibility open, the state has a
perverse incentive to withhold 100% of the overtime wages due.
In Alden, Justice Kennedy brushed aside the argument from due
process. The plaintiffs were relying upon Reich v. Collins, a tax case in
which the Court had held that the state could not simply take the
money and run. 297 The state had to supply remedies. And it would
not do to promise remedies and then take them away-to play "a shell
game with remedies," as I commented elsewhere. 298 Justice Kennedy
purported to distinguish Reich as a case in which the state's obligation
flowed directly from the Due Process Clause.2 99 But when a state takes
one's property, of course an obligation arises under the Due Process
3 00
Clause, in Alden as in Reich.
294 McKesson, 496 U.S. at 31; cf Gen. Oil Co.v. Grain, 209 U.S. 211, 226-30 (1908)
(suggesting that due process requires adjudication in state court of claims against the
state, if federal courts are closed to those claims).
295 McKesson, 496 U.S. at 31.
296 If the Court does not recognize the challenge to due process flowing from
Alden and its companion cases, it is hard to see how any difference can be made by
the Leahy bill, Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835, 106th
Cong. (1999). The bill is intended to overcome the problem of state takings of intellectual property posed by FloridaPrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board v.Coll.,e

Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding the patent laws unenforceable as against a

state). See, for an early consideration of the problem, Mitchell N. Berman et al., State
Accountabilityfor Violation of Intellectual Property Rights: HoW to 'ix"Florida Prepaid and
How Not To, 79 TEx. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001) (manuscript on file with the atthor). But the Fourteenth Amendment power exercised in the Leahy bill has already
been rejected for that purpose in FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 630.
297 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999).
298 Weinberg, The Article X Box, supra note 10, at 1428.
299 Alden, 527 U.S. at 740.
300 For a fuller exposition of this argument, see Weinberg, The Article III Box, supra
note 10, at 1428-29.
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For example, in F/oridaPrepaid,the patent case coming up from
the federal courts in the same term as Alden, the Supreme Court, relying on the Eleventh Amendment, denied a patentee a remedy against
an infringing state.30 1 This, even though, as the Court specifically

held, Congress had clearly amended the patent laws to abrogate the
states' Eleventh Amendment immunity3 0 2 But the Court had already
held that Article I was not a source of legislative power to abrogate
state immunity-recall that that had happened in the Seninole Tribe
case. 30 3 So Congress, under its Article I powers, now, incredibly cannot make a state liable for patent infringement. Of course, there is
always Ex parte Young. But Young can yield only an injunction against
future infringement. It cannot yield retroactive compensation for a
deprivation of property rights. In other words, a state university, with
impunity, can now deprive an owner of intellectual property of her
federal statutory rights. It seems obvious that this will deprive her of
her constitutional rights3 0 4 at the same time.305
The urgent question then becomes whether Congress's Fourteenth Amendment powers can be summoned up to mend this breach
in due process. And indeed, the patentee in FloridaPrepaiddid argue
that the defendant state had deprived it of property without due process of law.3 0 6 One might have supposed that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, given Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, arms Congress with all
the power it needs to abrogate state immunity from such a constitutional claim. And Chief Justice Rehnquist, for the Florida Prepaid
Court, did acknowledge that a patent might be property.3 0 7 But he
°s
doubted-I daresay to the astonishment of the informed reader3 301 527 U.S. at 647.
302

See id. at 635.

303 See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73 (1996).

304 I refer here to rights against deprivations of property not for public use.
305 See the bill proposed by Senator Leahy, Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835, 106th Cong. (1st Sess. 1999), a bill "[t]o restore Federal
remedies for violations of intellectual property rights by States, and for other pur-

poses;" id. at § It(a) (11) (A) (finding that Seminole Trib4 Rorida Prepaidand College
Savings Bank together "have the potential to deprive private intellectual property owm-

ers of effective protection for both their Federal intellectual property rights and their
constitutional rights under the fifth and fourteenth amendments of the United States
Constitution").

306

See FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 637.

307 Id.
308 See, e.g., 145 CONG. REc. S10,359 (daily ed. Aug. 5, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Arlen Specter) (deploring Florida Prepaid as an "absurd and untenable state of affairs"); 145 CONG. REc. S8069-70 (daily ed. July 1, 1999) (statement of Sen. Patrick
Leahy) (emphasizing that there should not be "one law for private universities, libraries, and educational institutions" and another for "State-run institutions").
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that a constitutional problem of any scale existed.3 0 9 In part, this
doubt of the Chief Justice was not only that state infringements of
patent rights are sufficiently widespread, but also that they invariably

31
rise to the dignity of constitutional as well as statutory violations. 11

This sort of thinking is important to the Chief Justice, who has long
labored to disabuse the civil rights bar of a stubborn (and, to my
thinking, correct) conviction that a government's wrongdoing is nec31
essarily of constitutional dimension. '
The attack has focused on the bare Due Process Clause-the
unadorned allegation of a deprivation without due process-and has
proceeded on three fronts. First, cases like Justice Rehnquist's Parralt
v. Taylor31 2 hold that when "deprivations" are not authorized by state
law and occur in an unplanned way,3 13 they are not necessarily violations of due process. The state need only provide the process that is
due-some post-deprivation remedy, like an action in tort. Today it is
unlikely that an unauthorized and random deprivation of liberty will
be identified as a violation of due process if a post-deprivation state
remedy, particularly an action in tort, is available. 31" Second, in cases
309 See FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 645-48. But see, e.g., Planned Parenthood of S.E.
Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 894 (1992) (plurality opinion) ("The proper focus of constitutional inquiry is the group for whom the law is a restriction, not the group for
whom the law is irrelevant."). Moreover, even supposing the ChiefJustice's somewhat
dated sources are good, it is not a necessary conclusion from them that there is little
misappropriation. A paucity of filed claims as easily suggests that legislation has been
effectively deterrent as that it addresses an unreal problem.
310 See FloridaPrepaid,527 U.S. at 640-41.
311 See DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 202
(1989) (Rehnquist, CJ.) ("[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,... as we have said many times, does not transform every tort committed by a
state actor into a constitutional violation." (citing Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327,
335-36 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J.); Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277, 285 (1980); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701
(1976) (Rehnquist, J.))); see also, e.g., Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 472 (1994),
reh'g denied, 512 U.S. 1247 (1994) (Rehnquist, CJ.) ("Our cases do not support the
proposition that every action by the President, or by another executive official, in
excess of his statutory authority is ipso facto in violation of the Constitution."). See
generallyWEINBERG, FEDERAL COURTS, supra note 25, at 1060-77.
312 451 U.S. 527, 544 (1981) (Rehnquist,J.) (finding no due process violation in a
negligent deprivation of a prisoner's property, given the availability of a state tort
remedy).
313 Id. at 541 ("random and unauthorized").
314 But deprivations in disregard of state procedural protections may still be held
to violate the Due Process Clause. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 138
(1990) (Blackmun, J.) (holding it a denial of due process that state mental hospital
officials treated the plaintiff as if applying for voluntary commitment, denying him
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like Justice Rehnquist's Daniel v. Willianzs, 1 the Court has taken the
position that mere negligence will not support a due process claim;
the alleged deprivation must be intentional. Third, Chief Justice
Rehnquist argues that some intentional torts by governmental officials
are, in their nature, ordinary state-law torts,3 1 6 or ordinary statutory
violations,3 17 and that the Constitution does not speak to those sorts
of cases.
Against this background, the Chief Justice found it easy to conclude in Florida Prepaidthat occasional state infringements of patents
did not amount to violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. That, in
turn, meant that Congress was without sufficient basis for the exercise
of its Fourteenth Amendment powers.
This insistence that if Congress is calling upon its Fourteenth
Amendment powers, it can act only on a basis of widespread constitutional violation, rather than a rational basis, was an application of the
stringent tests of "proportionality and congruence" that now limit
Congress, under the important case of City ofBoerne v. Flores.3 18 Given
Boerne and Seminole and FloidaPrepaidand Alden, do further efforts by
Congress to protect intellectual property from state infringement have
any likelihood of meaningful success? That question is grounded in
elementary considerations of fair play and substantial justice, but
these cases seem to answer it in advance, and the answer is "No." 3 19
An extension of concurrentjurisdiction over federal intellectual property cases to the state courts would run into Alden v. Maine, of course.
On the other hand, there might be something in some version of
the proposed bill tentatively circulated by Senator Patrick Leahy. 32"
the pre-deprivation procedural protections state law provided for involuntary
commitments).

315 Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 335-36 (1986) (Rehnquist, J.) (holding that
a prisoner's personal injuries caused by a prison official's mere negligence could not
support a claim under the Due Process Clause).
316 See, eg., Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. at 694, 701 (Relnquist,J.) (holding a defamatory police circular not actionable under § 1983).
317 See, e.g., Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 472 (1994) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (explaining that not every statutory violation by an official is a constitutional %iolation).
318 521 U.S. 507,529 (1997) (holding, under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, that an act of Congress under the § 5 power must be congruent ith and pro-

portional to a found pattern or likelihood of constitutional violation).
319 For recent writing on the problem of enforcement of federal intellectual property rights after Forida Prepaid,see, for example, Synmposium, 33 Loy. LA. L RE,. 1275
(2000).
320 Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 1999, S. 1835, 106th Cong.
(1999) (proposing "To restore Federal remedies for diolations of intellectual property
rights by States, and for other purposes").
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Under this proposal, Congress, acting under its Fourteenth Amend-

ment power, requires the states to waive immunity from suit in order

to gain access to the protections of federal law for the state's own intellectual property. It is unclear whether the Court would sustain this
exercise of Fourteenth Amendment power, since the Court has already held, in FloidaPrepaid,that there is an insufficient basis for ex-

ercise of Fourteenth Amendment power in this context. 21 But that to
one side, why is not the most likely outcome of such legislation that
the states would cheerfully decline to opt into the protections of fed-

eral law, deciding instead to create a patchwork of disuniform little
patent acts giving them some measure of protection under state

law?322 Or they could simply choose to rely on their existing common
law of misappropriation and unfair competition. But even if some version of the Leahy Bill did patch up the gaping hole in federal intellectual property law without such unintended consequences, its
technique is not necessarily going to be duplicable in the contexts of

state violations of other federal laws grounded in Article I.
Should some version of Senator Leahy's proposal fail of enactment or, if enacted, meet the fate that befell the Religious Freedom

Restoration Act,3 23 there is a remaining possibility of justice, and poetic justice at that. If, in the wake of Alden and Seminole Tribe, the
widespread pattern of infringement that the Florida Prepaid Court
failed to identify under the Boerne standards begins to emerge, would
not that fresh pattern empower Congress under the Fourteenth
3 24

Amendment?

321 Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.v. Coil. Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,
630 (1999).
322 Cf Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 571 (1973) (declining to hold that
California's law against piracy of music was preempted by national copyright policy).
A proliferation of little antitrust statutes appeared, for example, in the wake of the
Supreme Court's decision in Illinois Brick v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (denying
rights under the Sherman Act to indirect purchasers). These state statutes were held
not preempted by national antitrust policy. See California v. ARC America Corp., 490
U.S. 93, 105-06 (1989) (sustaining state indirect-purchaser statutes as not preemptcd
by the rule of Illinois Brick). For background on copyright preemption, see WEINUtR0,
FEDERAL COURTS, supranote 25, at 201-09; for background on ARC America, see id. at
159-61; Weinberg, The Federal-StateConflict, supra note 9, at 1760-72, 1783-84.

323 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (1994). The Act was struck down as a violation of
the principle of separation of powers. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536
(1997). Congress had attempted to heighten the tier of scrutiny prescribed by the
Court for state denials of religious exemptions from generally applicable neutral laws.
See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (requiring only minimal rationalbasis scrutiny).
324 Professor Meltzer has suggested that narrow legislation authorizing access to
federal courts for damages suits against infringers be grounded on a showing of wide-
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One might hope that a future Supreme Court, regretting the step
taken in /orida Prepaid,could find that FloridaPrepaidgave too little
consideration to the Copyright Clause of Article I, Section 8.-4 The
Copyright Clause is a source of specific power to encourage science
and the useful arts and to establish the uniform rights of intellectual
property necessary to that national policy. The Court should have
seen that the Copyright Clause speaks with sufficient power to distinguish intellectual property cases from the general run of commercial
cases.326 In some future case, a future Supreme Court might be uilling to say that the states submitted themselves "in the plan of the Convention" to liability for infringements of intellectual property rights.
But for now Florida Prepaid covers all of that ground and clearly extends Seminole to the Copyright Clause. Any anrihrespens~es await an
uncertain future at best.
The new Alden/Seminole regime is largely limited in its force and
effect to commercial statutory claims in the typical ambit of Article I.
But this limit, if it is thought to protect civil rights, may be no limit at
all. Several of our civil rights laws, particularly laws protecting against
private discriminatory conduct, have been tested, not under Section 5
of the Fourteenth Amendment, where they would almost certainly fail
to survive under The Civil Rights Cases,327 even if they survived under
Boerne, but under the commerce power - 8s If Alden and Seminole do
not seem to be a real threat to civil rights legislation, the saving feature is not to be found in those cases, but rather in the fortuity that
the Ex parte Young officer suit, ineffective to remedy past takings of
personal property, 29 retains utility in civil rights cases on other theories. On the other hand, apparently the prospective relief Ex parte
Young is supposed to provide is not working very well either. A new
inability of the trial judiciary to understand Exparte Youngas a permisspread denials of relief under state law. Statement of Daniel Meltzer before the Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual Property, Committee on theJudiciar) United

States House of Representatives (July 27, 2000). To be sure, such arguments were
held insufficient to support the Violence Against Women Act, U.S. v. Morrison, 120 S.
Ct. 1740, 1759 (2000); see supra note 4.
325 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
326 For agreement on this point see Shapiro, The 1999 Tlilo, supra note 15, at
755.
327 109 U.S. 3, 23-25 (1883) (holding that Congress's Fourteenth Amendment
power is over state, not private, action). For the most recent casualty of The Civil
Rights Cases, see United States v. Morrison, 120 S. Ct. 1740 (2000).
328 See, eg., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261 (1964)
(sustaining the Place of Public Accommodations Act under Congress's commerce
power).
329 See supra notes 287-90 and accompanying text.
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sible official-capacity action also cannot be helping,3 30 whether attributable to political hostility to civil rights enforcement or to sheer
ignorance or to confusion with the Court's official-capacity/individual-capacity jurisprudence in damages cases. The Supreme Court itself seems increasingly inhospitable to the Young device. In Coeur
d/Alene,3 3 1 for example, Justice Kennedy took occasion to launch this
astonishing attack upon Ex parte Young:
To interpret Young to permit a federal court-action to proceed in
every case where prospective declaratory and injunctive relief is
sought against an officer, named in his individual capacity, would be
to adhere to an empty formalism and to undermine the principle,
reaffirmed just last Term in Seminole Tribe, that Eleventh Amendment immunity represents a real limitation on a federal court's federal-questionjurisdiction. The real interests served by the Eleventh
Amendment are not to be sacrificed to elementary mechanics of
captions and pleading. Application of the Young exception must
reflect a proper understanding of its role in our federal system and
respect for state courts instead of a reflexive reliance on an obvious
33 2
fiction.
It is a pity that Justice Kennedy perceives principles in the Eleventh Amendment, but not in the Due Process Clause, that are not to
be sacrificed. It is ironic that Justice Kennedy does not perceive the
Court as undermining vested federal rights in what may well seem to
the reader a "reflexive" assault on the means of vindicating them. It is
regrettable that the Rehnquist Court, even more actively than had
been anticipated, is subordinating federal rights to the states' illegitimate interests-for what else can they be?-in violating them.

330 See, for a recent example, Power v. Summers, 226 F.3d 815, 820-21 (7th Cir.
2000) (PosnerJ.) (instructing the district court, in an action against officials of a state
university for retaliatory withholding of merit raises, that an Ex parle Young action for
an injunction against future violations of the plaintiff professors' First Amendment
rights was proper and should not have been dismissed). For a determinedly crabbed
recent reading of Ex parte Young, see Westside Mothers v. Haveman, 133 F. Supp. 2d 549
(E.D. Mich. 2001) (denyingjudicial power to order state officials to furnish Medicaidauthorized services they were withholding from indigent children;justifying the result
by relying on pre-Young case lav; arguing strongly, in the teeth of cases to the contrary, that legislation under the Spending Clause is not judicially enforceable, and
even suggesting that Congress lacks power to make such legislation judicially
enforceable).
331 Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
332 Id. at 270.
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As ProfessorJackson has said, "The Court's Eleventh Amendment
and sovereign immunity case law deserves the condemnation and re333
sistance of scholars."
CONCLUSION:

Two BAD

MELODR.AMAS, ONE LAST

ACT

Alden is the last act, not only of this bad melodrama, but of another springing from a somewhat different impulse; and the two must
be seen together to be understood. The Hans/ Seminole/Alden story
must be understood against the background of the LopeziBoerne/Al-

den story. The message is that Congress does not have the capacity to
govern this country with which, we supposed, the Founders endowed
it, the power that ChiefJustice Marshall made plain, that the Civil War

paid for in blood, and that the post New Deal Court, we imagined,
finally acknowledged.

There are very few silver linings in these clouds. It is always possible that a state will itself see the advisability of waivers of immunity, at

least with respect to the claims of contract creditors.3 34 Political considerations, and the expectations of a civil society, while no substitute
for the rule of law, can yield state responsibility in the occasional case.
But changing the Supreme Court's new dispensation of approved government lawlessness must await action by Congress. Yet the options
are few. The Article V amendment process is not a realistic strategy.

For the most part, Congress may well be limited, in efforts to constrain

333 Jackson, Principle and Compromise supra note 15, at 953.
334 The state prospers when, for the sake of its good credit, it stands by its own
undertakings and submits them to the rule of law. That is a proposition that the
democracies have been trying to explain to underdeveloped nations for decades. The
Hans Court counted on state waiver:
The legislative department of a State represents its polity and its will; and is
called upon by the highest demands of natural and political law to preserve
justice and judgment, and to hold inviolate the public obligations. Any departure from this rule, except for reasons most cogent, (of which the legislature, and not the courts, is the judge), never fails in the end to incur te
odium of the world, and to bring lasting injury upon the State itself.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (Bradley, J.).
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the lawless state, to the narrow opportunities presented by its power to
33 5
condition spending.
What we can say with some confidence is that Alden is not only
intellectually insupportable, as I have been mainly arguing, but it is
simply wrong. Of course federalism is a vital part of the Constitution.
But Alden fails to respect federalism in its true meaning. The Supreme Court has been insufficiently mindful of James Madison's important insight, that our dual federalism gives us a double guarantee
of freedom.3 3 6 It is a noble idea, one of the finest expressions of the
Jeffersonian view. Madison contemplated that if the national guarantor should become heedless of individual rights, or should be rendered impotent to protect them, then that other guarantor of liberty,
the state, would have powers to protect-"secure"-them. Thus, at
the very least, the existence of the states is a guarantee to provide what
the nation may be unable to provide: law, or remedies, or courts. Alden breaks this pledge.
We have seen that the Court's new citadel of state immunity is
constructed on shoddy foundations: "federalism" without its reason
and "sovereignty" without the people. And within the citadel, more a
bunker than a citadel, the states can hunker down, if they like, free
from the constraints of enforceable federal law, to enjoy what they can
take from their own populations. The garish new structure is a most
hurtful scar on the constitutional landscape. Yet it appears most unlikely that the needed assault upon this citadel can be mounted in our
lifetime.

335 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07 (1987) (holding that objectives
not thought to be within Article I's enumeration may nevertheless be attained
through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds).
The Alden Court left this option open. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999)
(citing South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) ("Nor, subject to constitutional
limitations, does the Federal Government lack the authority or means to seek the
States' voluntary consent to private suits.")).
336 "In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people
is... divided.... Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people." Tue
FEDERALIST No. 51, at 339 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1940); ef. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) (O'Connor, J.). For my Madisonian views,
see, for example, Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIo N.U. L. REv. 1295
(1997).

